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This study seeks to examine the wealth effects of U.S. REITs property dispositions 
from 2001 to 2009 and to assess the factors that contribute to the wealth effects.  
Some studies have been done on REITs mergers and acquisitions, but few focus on 
property level transactions especially property dispositions. The limited research on 
property transactions does not utilize the full information content of transaction 
price in evaluating the transactions. This study emphasizes the role of sale price in 
explaining the wealth effects of REITs property dispositions. It also examines the 
considerations addressed in previous studies. 
To investigate the wealth effects of REITs property dispositions, this study employs 
the event study methodology. It finds that property dispositions by REITs generate 
positive significant abnormal shareholder returns around the disposition 
announcement date. The average abnormal returns on the event day and the day 
before the disposition announcement are 0.18% and 0.14% respectively. The three-
day average abnormal return is found to be 0.26%. These results are consistent with 
previous studies by Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) on REITs property sell-
offs.  
This study further analyzes the sources of value gains in property dispositions using 
cross sectional regressions. We identify capitalization rate (cap rate) as an 
important factor that affects the shareholder returns. We utilize the information 
content of cap rate to carry out a comparison between the overall market cap rate 
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and the transacted cap rate and find that in some transactions differences exist and 
contribute to shareholder returns. 
We observe that the property dispositions change the average yield of the divesting 
REIT’s remaining portfolio. We classify a property disposition as yield accretive 
and yield dilutive based on whether it increases or reduces the average yield of the 
REIT’s portfolio. We find evidence that yield dilutive dispositions result in higher 
abnormal returns. This is because that the dispositions lower the risk exposing to 
the divesting REIT’s shareholders.  
We also find that the abnormal returns are positively related to the REITs debt ratio 
prior to the property dispositions and the decision to use the proceeds to pay back 
existing debt. These findings are consistent with Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, (1995) 
and support the financing hypothesis of asset dispositions.  
In general, this study presents fresh evidence on REITs property transactions. It 
confirms the important role of cap rate in influencing shareholder returns upon 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a general introduction to the background, research questions, 
motivation, significance, hypothesis and organization of this dissertation. 
1.1 REITs Property Transactions Trend 
As indicated by Ambrose, Highfield and Linneman (2005), mergers and acquisitions 
began to take place in 1996 and 1997 with rising stock prices. The period of 1997–
1999 was a particularly consolidation period for REITs and 2001 was the third-busiest 
year for REIT merger and acquisitions activity, after 1997 and 1998. According to 
SNL Financial database statistics, the number of properties bought and sold by 
publicly traded U.S. equity REITs has declined steadily since 2005. Merger, 
acquisitions and high property valuations helped to drive transactions to high levels in 
2005 and 2006. However, transactions declined dramatically in 2007, leading to a 
five-year low in 2009. After 2007, REITs focus on improving balance sheet 
fundamentals, reducing leverage and short-term debt maturities. Most REITs limit 
property transactions in 2008 and 2009.  
U.S. equity REITs acquired assets with a value of about $54 billion in 2005. In 2008, 
this value declined to more than $14 billion, and 2009 showed a five-year low in 
property acquisition values, just a little more than $3 billion. Property disposition 
showed a similar trend. The value of REITs property disposition is more than $88 
billion in 2007, but this number dropped to only $5 billion in 2009. Table 1.1 




Table 1.1 Number of U.S. Equity REITs Property Transactions by Year 
Panel A Number of Property Acquisitions    
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Multifamily  364 272 172 58 17 
Retail 2,197 1,350 1,190 324 97 
Office 799 603 488 107 61 
Industrial 524 340 253 94 20 
Health care 402 660 396 226 103 
Hotel 163 147 246 19 2 
Self-storage 292 816 97 71 4 
Other  1,610 600 585 197 56 
All property types 6,351 4,788 3,427 1,096 360 
Panel B Number of Property Dispositions    
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Multifamily  346 818 539 391 215 
Retail 458 789 1,387 254 249 
Office 545 852 825 1,207 82 
Industrial 816 579 514 426 138 
Health care 70 313 362 193 53 
Hotel 63 177 399 20 142 
Self-storage 28 643 15 31 25 
Other  486 10,575 2,674 220 90 
All property types 2,812 14,746 6,715 2,742 994 
  Source: SNL Financial  
Figure 1.1 describes the trends of REITs property transactions from 2005 to 2009. 
The number of property acquisitions declined from 2005 to 2009, with a sharper 
decline from 2007 to 2008. The number of property dispositions increases sharply 
from 2005 to 2006 and after 2006 it exhibits a declining trend till 2009.  REITs 
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dispose more properties than they acquire properties for all the years except for 2005. 
The high number of dispositions in 2006 and 2007 resulted from large portfolio sales 
driven by M&A and privatizations in 2005 through 2007.  
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  Source: SNL Financial 
1.2 Research Questions 
This thesis focuses on the wealth effects of property dispositions by U.S. public listed 
equity REITs. We attempt to answer the following questions. 1) Do REITs property 
dispositions provide positive wealth effects for shareholders? 2) Are shareholder 
returns related to the difference between the transacted capitalization rate (cap rate) 
and the average market cap rate? 3) Are shareholder returns related to the difference 
between the transacted cap rate and the selling REIT’s dividend yield? 4) Are 




1.3 Motivation of the Study 
There is a substantial volume of research on mergers, tender offers, corporate spin-
offs and corporate asset dispositions. Asset disposition is one of the restructuring 
activities which change the asset and liability composition of a firm. Evidence has 
been mounting that asset dispositions are value enhancing activities for the selling 
firms, as the share price of the selling firms experience substantial appreciation upon 
the announcement of asset dispositions. The theories advanced in the literature to 
explain this empirical evidence broadly include the efficiency hypothesis, the focus 
hypothesis and the financing hypothesis. 
The existing three hypotheses explain the positive abnormal returns on asset 
dispositions from the strategic considerations behind the disposition, either the 
motivation prior to the disposition or the use of the proceeds after the disposition. The 
efficiency hypothesis states that asset disposition is motivated by the inefficient 
management of the asset by the existing owner and the asset is disposed of to another 
party for better use (Hite, Owers and Rogers, 1987). The focus hypothesis provides 
another motivation for asset disposition which lies in the lack of fit between the 
divesting asset and the corporate main business, and the asset is divested to increase 
corporate focus (John and Ofek, 1995).  The financing hypothesis regards asset 
disposition as a way of generating funds for poorly performed firms, and explains 
asset dispositions by analyzing the use of the proceeds from dispositions. The stock 
market is in favor of asset disposition with the proceeds paid out while the gain from 
disposition is discounted when the proceeds are retained by the selling firm (Lang et 
al., 1995).  
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Other than the strategic considerations behind asset dispositions, the relevant 
information necessary to evaluate asset dispositions is also embodied in the sale price 
itself. However, little research has been done in this perspective. There are several 
exceptional studies. Klein (1986) finds that the sale price information is essential for 
the market to assess an asset disposition. She shows that the announcement day effect 
is only significantly positive when the price is disclosed at the initial disposition 
announcement, and is not statistically different from zero if there is no price 
information. Afshar, Taffler and Sudarsanam (1992) and Sicherman and Pettway 
(1992) further confirm the significance of price disclosure. Clubb and Stouraitis 
(2002) also utilize the price information.  They examine the wealth effects of 187 
division sell-offs by U.K. companies from 1984 to 1994. The divested divisions in 
their sample include conventional corporate divisions as well as financial and real 
estate divisions. The disposition profit is calculated as the difference between sale 
price and the value of the assets in current use. Their results show that the abnormal 
return is positively related to the disposition profit. They argue that sell-off 
profitability is one of the most significant determinants of the market reaction to 
divestiture announcements. Campbell and Owers (2010) examine the wealth effects of 
operating asset exchanges. They find that firms providing indication of the value of 
the traded assets experience significantly higher abnormal returns than those that do 
not. They argue that the positive returns observed for divesting firms are more closely 
related to the disclosure of value information than to an increase in focus. 
Motivated by the paucity of relevant empirical work analyzing the price information 
in corporate divestitures, we investigate the wealth effects of REITs property 
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dispositions, and further assess the role of sale price in explaining the divestiture 
gains.  
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Property acquisitions provide an important and convenient way through which REITs 
expand and consolidate over time. Meanwhile, REITs dispose of properties almost as 
frequently as they acquire. Property transactions happen at a higher frequency than 
conventional corporate assets transactions. Given the rapid increase in REITs property 
transactions, the question of the value gain of these transactions arises.  
Most of the REITs acquisitions studies focus on the corporate level mergers. The 
property level transactions are under researched especially from the disposition side. 
Thus far, none of the REITs property transaction studies have utilized the full 
information content of transaction price and its impact on the stock market reactions 
of property transactions. Neither is there work done on linking information from 
property market and capital market upon a property disposition announcement.  This 
study attempts to fill these gaps by utilizing the information content of capitalization 
rate in a property disposition. Real estate cap rate captures important information 
about property transactions, revealing the transacted price of a property. Cap rate 
plays an important role in property valuation and reflects how properties are priced. 
Hendershott and MacGregor, (2005) note that a low cap rate indicates the investor’s 
willingness to pay a relatively high price for per dollar of current cash flow, while a 
high cap rate indicates the reverse. We examine the wealth effects of REITs property 
dispositions and evaluate to what extent the information on cap rate or sale price 
affects the wealth effects. Employing the event study methodology, we empirically 
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test whether REITs property dispositions increase shareholder values. If they do, we 
aim to identify the factors that contribute to the positive values. 
Compared to previous work on property transactions, our findings provide new 
insights. We utilize the information of cap rate by revealing the difference between 
the overall market cap rate and the transaction cap rate, the difference between the 
transaction cap rate and divesting REIT dividend yield and the difference between the 
property yield and the REIT portfolio yield.  We find that the transaction cap rate 
associated with a property disposition has significant explanatory power for selling 
REITs abnormal returns after controlling for the strategic considerations behind 
dispositions previously addressed in the literature. The evidence shows that the larger 
the difference between overall market cap rate and the transaction cap rate, the higher 
the abnormal returns around property disposition announcements. This is due to good 
information revelation that the current property is sold at a higher price (lower cap 
rate) compared to the average property transaction price. We also find that yield 
dilutive dispositions increase shareholder returns by lowering the risk. 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to the background, research questions, 
motivation, significance and organization of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of studies relevant REITs property dispositions.  
Chapter 3 introduces the development of hypotheses and describes the empirical 
methodology. We develop three testable hypotheses which involve three key cap rate 
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variables used in the regressions. We then describe the event study methodology and 
the event parameter model used to examine the wealth effects of property dispositions 
followed with the cross-sectional regression to further analyze the sources of the 
wealth effects. 
Chapter 4 explains the research data. 
Chapter 5 presents empirical findings of this study. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing some of the key findings, limitations 
of the study, and future extensions to the current research are also discussed. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
The literature on corporate divestitures is highly developed. In corporate finance, 
corporate divestiture is a component of the broader literature of corporate 
reorganization. Divestiture is viewed as a part of merger and acquisition (M & A). 
Though asset disposition is a type of divestiture rather a merger or acquisition, it is a 
reorganization tool that firms frequently use. In order to provide a clear and 
comprehensive understanding of the current literature related to this study, this 
chapter begins with a review of M & A literature, and then follows with a review of 
previous works on corporate divestitures. Then it discusses studies on acquisitions and 
divestitures within the REIT industry. As we empathizes the importance of cap rate 
and its relationship with dividend yield in affecting the wealth effects, we also give a 
review of previous studies on cap rate and the integration of the direct real estate 
market and indirect real estate market.     
2.1 Corporate Acquisitions  
Coase (1937) introduce the classical theory of firm. In his seminar paper, he suggests 
that the introduction of firm is due to the existence of transaction costs. Following 
transaction costs, agency costs and costs of imperfect contracting and moral hazard 
also explain why the within firm transactions are less costly than market transactions. 
An asset standing alone as a single entity may have less value than being a division of 
a firm.  How firm as a conglomerate generates value depends on the value of shared 
resources such as managerial knowledge and internal capital. Such values differ 
across industries, firms and through time. As such values change over time, the firms 
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expend and breakup as response. That is mainly why mergers and acquisitions, 
divestitures and spinoffs happen over time.   
2.1.1 The Wealth Effects of Corporate Acquisitions  
An acquisition is the purchase by one firm of a substantial part of the assets or 
securities of another firm. It is the investment decision of the acquiring firm. There 
are two forms of bid in an acquisition: merger agreement and tender offer. The 
difference is in a merger agreement, the bidder negotiate with the target’s managers, 
while in a tender offer, the bidder makes a direct offer to the target’s shareholders.  
Acquisitions are viewed as a convenient way of growth and tend to happen in the 
periods of economic expansion. There three recognized merger waves which are in 
the late 1960s, the 1980s and the late 1990s.  
Empirical research on the wealth effects of acquisition focus on bidder and target 
shareholder returns. The consensus conclusion is that the target shareholders earn 
significant positive abnormal returns while the results on acquiring shareholders 
returns are controversial. In a survey of the literature on the market for corporate 
control, Jensen and Ruback (1983) report that the return to acquiring shareholders is 
3.8% in tender offers and is approximately zero to bidders in mergers.  
Table 2.1 reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for corporate acquisition 
announcements for large sample (with observations larger than 1000). It includes five 















Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) 
1.8% for total 
sample 
3,135 1990-2000 (-2,2) 
 -1.0% when target is public   
 
2.1% when target is private 
 
  
Akbulut and Matsusaka 
(2003) 
1.2% for related 
acquisitions 
3,466 1950-2000 (-2,1) 
 1.1% for unrelated acquisitions 
 
 
Officer (2003) -1.2% for attempted  
mergers and tender 
offers 
 
2,511 1988-2000 (-3,3) 
Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2004, 2005) 
1.1% for total 
sample 
12,023 1980-2001 (-1,1) 
 
2.3% for small acquirers   
 0.1% for large acquirers 
 
  
Savor (2006) -3.5% for all-stock 
bidders 
1,484 1990-2000 (-1,1) 
  1.0% for all-cash bidders     
Source: Author, 2010    
 
2.1.2 The Motives of Corporate Acquisitions  
There are two categories of acquisition theories. The first category of theory discusses 
acquisitions motivated by the goal of value maximization, and several hypotheses are 
consistent with this category of theory. The two most frequently cited hypotheses 
which explain why acquisitions take place are the market for corporate control 
hypothesis and the synergy hypothesis. These two hypotheses share the view in 
common that value can be created through acquisitions. 
The second category of theory discusses acquisitions with non-value maximization 
motivations. Such acquisitions just maximize the growth of assets or enable the 
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management to control a larger empire while make no economic gains. The 
managerial discretion hypothesis and the hubris hypothesis discuss this type of 
acquisitions. These two hypotheses do not predict that acquisitions can increase 
efficiency and thereby shareholder wealth. 
The Market for Corporate Control Hypothesis 
The term “the market for corporate control” has attracted a lot of public attention and 
empirical research. It is brought forward by Manne (1965).  The market for corporate 
control or the takeover market is a market where different owners or bidders compete 
for the rights to manage companies with bad performance. The market for corporate 
control functions as a mechanism to eliminate the managements that pursue goals 
conflicting with shareholders’ interests or the incompetent managements. The 
difference in incentives and interests for managers and shareholders results from the 
separation of ownership and control, which in consequence leads to agency problem. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the concept of agency costs. As agent of 
shareholders, managers may consume perquisites. This managerial behaviour occurs 
because of the high costs of monitoring. No one shareholder would like to bear these 
costs given that all other shareholders also benefits from this monitoring, unless that 
shareholder held a substantial proportion of the shares.  
Under the market for corporate control hypothesis, an acquisition is facilitated by the 
depressed stock price and the acquiring firm is expected to gain through a subsequent 
capital gain. 
A stream of literature examines the hypothesis that the target firm in an acquisition is 
less efficient. Using Tobin's Q to measure managerial performance, Lang, Stulz and 
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Walkling (1989) find that the shareholders of low Q targets benefit more than the 
shareholders of high Q targets from takeovers, and target, bidder and total returns are 
higher for takeovers done by well-managed bidders for poorly managed targets. 
Acquisitions can create value when the bidders have better performance in 
management. Heron and Lie (2002) examine this issue for a large sample of firms that 
make acquisitions between 1985 and 1997. One of their findings is that prior to the 
acquisitions, acquirers exhibit higher levels of operating performance than their 
respective industry peers, and significantly outperform control firms with similar pre-
event operating performance.   
The Synergy Hypothesis 
The notion of synergy provides the explanation of what are the sources of value added 
to firms following an acquisition. Two types of synergies are operating synergy and 
financial synergy. Operating synergies include economies of scale and economies of 
scope. Economies of scale and economies of scope are extracted frequently from a 
broad set of literature. The economies of scale permits a reduction in average cost 
when total cost spreads over additional units and acquisitions lead to the savings due 
to the economies of scale. Another form of savings that the acquisition can achieve is 
economies of scope, which suggests that the merged company can combine 
knowledge in innovative ways to gain competitive advantage. Financial synergies 
exist if a cash-rich firm acquires a cash-poor firm. Smith and Kim (1994) find 
evidence supporting the financial synergy hypothesis. They divide bidders into 
different groups of “high free cashflow” and “slack poor”. They find that bidders, 
target and total returns are highest for acquisitions where there is a combination of 
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slack poor and free cash flow firms, while returns are negative where bidders and 
targets are similarly classified.   
The Managerial Discretion Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) argues that the principal–agent problem becomes sever if there are free 
cash flows. Managers who pursue their own goals instead of maximizing shareholder 
wealth may spend the free cash. Maximizing the growth in physical size of their 
corporation rather than the profits of the corporation or stockholder wealth is one of 
the managers’ goals (Mueller, 1969). Since acquisitions are a convenient means to 
growth, they are one way that managers spend the free cash flow. Harford (1999) 
finds that acquisitions by cash-rich firms are value decreasing. He argues that cash-
rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less 
likely to attract other bidders. Evidence shows that mergers in which the bidder is 
cash-rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance, and Harford 
uses the agency costs of free cash flow explanation to interpret this evidence. 
The Hubris Hypothesis 
Roll (1986) argues that takeovers are a zero sum game, and the target gains, the 
bidder loses. Under Roll’s hubris hypothesis, the offer by bidder management, who 
presumes that its valuation is correct, is likely to represent a random error and an 
overestimate of the value of the combined firm.  
2.2 Corporate Divestitures 
The divestiture is one type of corporate breakup transactions, and breakup 
transactions itself is one type of corporate restructuring activities. Breakup 
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transactions are activities which separate the corporate assets, and include 
divestitures, spinoffs, equity carve-outs and targeted stocks.  A divestiture is the sale 
of a division, a segment, a subsidiary or a product line of a firm. It changes the asset 
composition of a firm. In a divestiture, the seller receives cash or securities or a 
combination of the two from the buyer for the assets sold. The proceeds from the asset 
divestitures are either distributed to shareholders or used to repay debt or reinvested in 
other business.  In a spinoff, a public firm distributes its equity ownership if a 
subsidiary to its shareholders. Divestiture is desirable when another firm is willing to 
pay more than the assets are worth. When there are no willing buyers, spinoff is an 
alternative. A divestiture generates cash while a spinoff does not. 
2.2.1 The Wealth Effects of Divestitures 
Evidence has been mounting that divestitures are value enhancing activities for the 
selling firms as the share price of the selling firms experience substantial appreciation 
upon the announcement of asset dispositions.  
Table 2.2 reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for conventional corporate 
divestiture announcements and real estate asset disposition announcements in 10 















Panel A Conventional corporate divestitures  
Alexander, Benson and 
Kampmeyer (1984) 
0.3% 53 1964-1973 (-1,0) 
Jain (1985) 0.5% 1,062 1969-1981 (-1,0) 
Klein (1986) 1.6% 202 1970-1979 (-1,0) 
Hite, Owers and Rogers 
(1987) 
1.5% 114 1963-1981 (-1,0) 
John and Ofek (1995) 1.5% 258 1968-1988 (-2,0) 
Lang, Poulsen and 
Sudarsanam (1995) 
1.4% 93 1984-1989 (-1,0) 
Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) 1.1% 187 1984-1994 (-1,0) 
Panel B Real estate assets dispositions  
Glascock, Davidson and 
Sirmans (1991) 
1.5% 51 1971-1986 (-2,0) 
Mcintosh, Ott and Liang 
(1995) 
1.3% 38 1968-1990 (-1,0) 
Campbell, Petrova and 
Sirmans (2006) 
0.8% 139 1992-2002 (-1,1) 
Source: Author, 2010 
The CARs for the divestiture announcements in these are found to be positive, 
ranging from 0.3% to 1.6% across the different samples. 
2.2.2 The Sources of Gains in Divestitures 
The prior empirical research has found a positive shareholder wealth effect associated 
with asset divestitures.  The theories advanced in the literature to explain this 
empirical evidence broadly include the efficiency hypothesis, the financing hypothesis 





A firm’s decision to sell an asset may be prompted by poor growth prospect of the 
asset, and the asset with low efficiency is more likely to be divested. The shareholders 
of the selling corporate benefit only when the selling price is higher than the present 
value of the cash flows of the asset. This is possible if the asset can provide synergies 
to the buyer not available to the seller and the buyer can manage the asset more 
efficiently than the seller. Value gains are created in such transactions and seller 
catches part of this value gains through the premiums in the selling price, which can 
be reflected in the abnormal returns upon divestiture announcement. Hite, Owers, and 
Rogers (1987) argue that the positive abnormal returns for the selling shareholders 
come from the transfer of the asset from its current use to higher-valued use.  
John and Ofek (1995) find that seller abnormal returns are higher when the buyer is a 
leveraged buyout group who can improve the operating performance of the divested 
assets and when the divested assets are unrelated to the seller itself but related to the 
buyer.  
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) analyze the markets for corporate assets and examine 
the relationship between asset sales and firm productivity. They show that the 
probability that assets are divested is higher when such assets are in the selling firms’ 
noncore divisions and the seller’s other divisions have higher productivity, and the 
probability that a firm buy assets increases with the buyer’s efficiency. They conclude 
that most divestitures result in an increase in productive efficiency by redeploying 
assets from firms with low ability to firms with higher ability. 
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Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2003) also examine the role of managerial 
performance in the value creation in assets sales. They use Tobin’s Q, as a measure of 
management’s performance in managing the assets. They find that the value created 
highest in a divestiture is when the well managed buyer with a high Q acquires assets 
from the poorly managed seller with a low Q. Their evidence shows that reallocation 
of assets to better use creates value.    
Focus Hypothesis 
One of the motivations of divestitures is to sell assets which are not core business of a 
diversified firm. The divestiture of such assets leads to an increase in corporate focus 
and consequently improves the performance of the remaining assets. Kaplan and 
Weisback (1992) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that firms are more likely 
to sell peripheral assets. Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) find that firms 
tend to divest relatively small and noncore segments.  
There is substantial evidence that increase in corporate focus contributes to the value 
creation in divestitures. John and Ofek (1995) identify focus as a motivation for asset 
sales. They show that in 75% of the divestitures, the divested assets are out of the 
seller’s core business, defined as its primary four-digit Standard Industry 
classification (SIC) code. They measure focus using the number of lines of business 
the seller reports, a sales-based Herfindal index across different business segments 
and whether the divested division is the firm’s noncore business. They find that sellers 
become more focused after divestiture, and the abnormal returns are positively related 
to focusing measures.  They argue that firms sell assets to achieve a more focused 
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operation, which consequently improve the performance of the remaining assets, and 
draw a conclusion that increasing focus dominates other explanations for asset sales.  
Berger and Ofek (1999) study corporate refocusing activities. They examine the 
market reaction to the refocusing related divestiture announcements made by 
diversified firms and report a cumulative abnormal return of 7.3%.       
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) investigate segment divestitures with respect to the 
investment efficiency. They find relationship between segment sales and reduction in 
diversification discount. They also show that the abnormal returns around segment 
sale announcements increase with the degree of reduction in diversification discount 
and the degree of improvement in segment investments.  
Financing Hypothesis 
The financing hypothesis posits that asset dispositions serve as a way of generating 
cash for financially constrained firms. Issuing equity is not attractive because of 
information asymmetries, and debt is associated with agency costs. When these two 
sources of financing are too expensive, asset disposition provides an easier and 
cheaper source of new funds, especially for poor performers.  Alexander, Benson, and 
Kampmeyer (1984) and Jain (1985) show that asset dispositions follow a period of 
negative stock returns. Lang, Poulsenb and Stulz (1995) and Schlingemann, Stulz and 
Walking (2002) find evidence that asset dispositions follow poor operating 
performance or high leverage. Officer (2007) finds that firms selling assets tend to be 
liquidity constrained, having relative low cash balances, cash flow and lower bond 
ratings than industry and size matched control peers. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1992) and Ofek (1993) find that financially distressed firms dispose of assets 
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frequently as a part of restructuring activities. Evidence also shows that financially 
constrained firms prefer asset dispositions to spin-offs, which do not generate cash 
(Nixon, Roenfeldt and Sicherman, 2000).   
When a firm is financially distressed, the optimal use of proceeds from asset 
dispositions changes. Lang, Poulsenb and Stulz (1995) argue that asset disposition is 
related to the financing needs of a firm. They explain asset dispositions by analyzing 
the use of the proceeds from dispositions, which is associated with the agency cost of 
managerial discretion. They find that the stock market is in favor of asset disposition 
with the proceeds paid out while the gain from disposition discounts when the 
proceeds are reinvested by the selling firm.  
2.3 REITs Acquisitions and Divestitures 
Having given an overview of previous work on corporate acquisitions and 
divestitures, we specifically focus on relevant studies on acquisitions and divestitures 
within the REIT industry.  
In an early study, Allen and Sirmans (1987) measure the effects of REIT mergers on 
the wealth of the acquiring REIT’s shareholders, by examining a sample of 38 
acquisitions from 1977 to 1983. They use the mean adjusted return method to 
determine the abnormal performance of acquiring REITs. The results suggest that 
acquiring REITs experience a statistically significant CAR of 8.47% over ten days 
prior to the announcement. The authors suggest that the pre-announcement gains 
might be due to improved managerial efficiency.  
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McIntosh, Officer and Born (1989) followed up by analyzing the impact of 
acquisitions on specific target REITs. The sample includes 23 REITs that were 
subject to takeovers between July 1962 and December 1986. They use the market 
model to determine the performance of the REITs. In successful acquisitions, the 
REITs experience a significant abnormal return of 3.34% during the day before the 
announcement of the acquisition.  
Sahin (2005) examines the performance of acquisitions in the REIT industry around 
the acquisition announcement and in the long-run. The results suggest that the 
acquiring REITs experience significant negative abnormal returns while the target 
REITs earn significant positive abnormal returns during the three-day period around 
the announcement. The result shows that the long-run positive buy-and-hold abnormal 
return is consistent with an unexpected decline in cost of equity after acquisitions. 
A small stream of studies focuses on the property level transactions. MaIntosh, Ott 
and Liang (1995) examine the wealth effects of REITs property transactions and find 
no significant wealth effects for REITs acquisition and disposition announcements. 
However, their result shows that there is a significant positive wealth effect upon the 
property sale announcement when there is also an increase in dividends. 
Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) investigate the shareholder wealth effects of 
REITs property portfolio acquisitions and find positive announcement-period 
shareholder returns. They attribute the positive effects to geographical focus, and the 
positive information related to the use of project-specific private debt and the use of 
stock privately placed with financial institutions. 
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Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) investigate REITs property sell-offs and find 
positive abnormal shareholder returns. They argue that the real estate asset 
undervaluation argument (Owers and Rogers, 1986; Ambrose, 1990; Ball, Rutherford 
and Shaw, 1993) or tax argument (Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans, 1991) is not 
suitable to explain abnormal returns experienced by REITs. They argue that REITs 
are not taxed and real estate asset is their primary asset class, not likely to be 
undervalued by analysts. They identify asset allocation efficiency as a primary source 
of positive returns in real estate sell-offs. This is the same as asset divestitures by 
conventional firms. Contrary to the findings of Lang, Poulsenb and Stulz (1995), they 
find that shareholder returns are negatively related to the use of proceeds to reduce 
debt, and explain this result with the signal hypothesis of leverage in finance theory.  
Following the research on conventional corporate acquisitions and divestitures, the 
limited research on REITs property transactions examine the wealth effects by 
analyzing the motivations and the use of the proceeds of the transactions. However, 
the informational value of transaction price was left unexplored in the literature. This 
study attempts to fill this gap by analyzing wealth effects of property dispositions 
using the information captured by the sale price. In several studies of conventional 
corporate asset divestitures, the sale price is identified as relevant to evaluating 
shareholder values. Klein (1986) finds that the sale price information is essential for 
the market to assess an asset disposition. She shows that the announcement day effect 
is only significantly positive when the price is disclosed at the initial disposition 
announcement, and is not statistically different from zero if there is no price 
information. Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) further utilize the sale price by computing 
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the disposition profit, and show that the abnormal return is positively related to the 
disposition profit. 
This thesis follows the aforementioned two studies, and analyzes how the sale price 
affects the shareholder values in property dispositions. In real estate market, property 
transactions are ongoing events. The frequency of property transactions is much 
higher than that of other corporate assets. This special attribute of real properties 
provides more room for exploring the information content of sale price. As there are 
many “like kind” transactions, it will be enlightening to compare the sale price of the 
current disposed property with other transacted properties of the same type.  We 
utilize the cap rate as an indirect price measure to investigate its contribution to 
shareholder values in property dispositions. The cap rate not only makes the sale price 
comparison possible, full utilization of it will also yield specific insights on real 
property transactions.     
2.4 Capitalization Rate 
Real estate cap rate is mainly determined by three factors. The first factor is the 
opportunity cost. Properties compete with other forms of assets for investor’s money. 
How much investors are willing to pay for per dollar NOI in property are also 
determined by the interest rates and the opportunities for getting returns in other types 
of investments, such as stocks and bonds. When the interest rate and returns on stock 
and bonds are low, investors will pay more for per dollar of NOI in property market, 
and hence reduce cap rate. The second factor is the growth expectations. The 
investors will forecast the growth of the rental income that the property can generate 
in future. The greater the growth opportunity, the more investors will pay for per 
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dollar of NOI, and the lower the cap rate will be. The last factor is risk. If the space 
market is stable and with less uncertainty, the future NOI generated from a property 
will be less risky, and investors will be willing to pay more for per dollar NOI, 
reducing cap rate.   
The cap rate has a widespread application in the pricing of real estate.  There are a lot 
of empirical works explaining the behavior of cap rate. A major stream of literature of 
cap rate examines the role of macro market factors, such as interest rate, stock 
earnings-price ratio and inflations, in driving the movements of cap rates over time. 
Froland (1987) compares the movements of cap rate and competitive yields in the 
asset markets and finds that variations in capitalization rates are a function of the 
mortgage rate, the corporate price-earnings ratio, and the ten-year bond rate. Evans 
(1990) examines the stochastic process of the stock market’s price-earnings ratio with 
the capitalization rate in real estate market. He finds that both markets adjust to 
macroeconomic conditions, but real estate is one quarter slower than stock market in 
the process of adjustment. Jud and Winkler (1995) examine the integration of cap rate 
with the debt and equity market spreads.  They find that cap rates are strongly related 
to returns in the capital markets, but the relation has significant lags. The market 
relationships are also found to vary across metropolitan areas. They conclude that real 
estate market is information inefficient and not completely integrated with the 
national capital market. Hendershott and MacGregor (2005) develop a model to link 
cap rate to the expected future rental growth and the stock market. They find that 
expected growth in real cash flows greatly determines cap rates, and cap rates are also 
linked to the equity capitalization rate (dividend yield). 
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Another theme of literature investigates the variations in cap rate across property 
types and over metropolitan areas. Ambrose and Nourse (1993) find that cap rates are 
negatively related to stock earnings-price ratios for the S&P 500 and positively related 
to the interest-rate spread. Their majoring finding is that property type differences are 
significant in evaluating cap rates while location factors are insignificant. Chichernea 
et al. (2008) examine the geographical variation of apartment cap rates, and find that 
the geographical differences are mainly determined by the difference in supply 
constraints and liquidity of geographical markets. 
The existing cap rate studies examine the variations of cap rates over time and across 
property types. The construction of models that track the historical variation in cap 
rates improves our understanding of the determinants of cap rates. The current study 
explores the usage of cap rate in evaluating a specific corporate event, the property 
disposition. The realized cap rate in a property disposition reflects the sale price of 
that property as well as the market condition in a specific time period. We use the 
average overall market cap rates as a benchmark for comparison with a transacted cap 
rate to reflect the relative sale price of a disposition as compared to the other 
transacted properties of the same type and within the same time period. This 
comparison is an important piece of information in evaluating property dispositions.   
An equity REIT manages a portfolio of properties. The yield of the portfolio is the 
NOI of all the properties divided by the portfolio value. As the composition of the 
portfolio changes upon property disposition, the yield of the portfolio changes as a 
consequence. The change in the yield and simultaneously in the risk of the divesting 
REIT’s portfolio will affect capital market’s assessment of the disposition. 
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By investigating the cap rate from several perspectives, this study further enhances 
the understanding of cap rate.   
2.5 The Integration of Direct and Indirect Real Estate Market 
REITs and other public traded property stocks are regarded as indirect real estate 
investment vehicles and a proxy for direct real estate investment. There is a theme of 
literature focusing on investigating the integration of the direct real estate market and 
the indirect or securitized real estate market. The basis for analyzing this integration 
lies in the fact that the underlying assets of the two markets are the same, and in an 
efficient market, the performance of indirect real estate investment vehicles should 
reflect the market value of the underlying assets of those real estate firms.  
Gyourko and Keim (1992) analyze the relationship between the securitized and direct 
real estate market by empirically testing the relationship between equity REIT returns 
and returns on a standard appraisal-based index in U.S. They find that REIT returns 
contain information that can be used to predict returns on the appraisal-based index 
four quarters ahead. Barkham and Geltner (1995) investigate the price discovery 
between securitized and direct commercial property markets in U.S. and U.K., and 
find a one year lagged period Grangen-causality from the securitized market to 
unsecuritized commercial market in UK. 
Studies in the integration of the two markets were also carried out using local market 
data. Ong (1995) examine the relationship between the property stock price and the 
property price in Singapore market and find a contemporaneous long-term between 
stock price index and real estate price index. In his earlier study, Ong (1994) tests the 
inter-temporal relationships between the property stock price and the property price 
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and find evidence of integration between the lagged property stock price and the 
contemporary property price. Liow (1998) confirms the results of Ong (1995), finding 
that the property equity performance leads commercial real estate by a quarter. 
Sing and Sng (2003) look into the integration of the securitized and unsecuritized real 
estate market using the conditional variance approach. They find that the integration 
between the two markets is unidirectional, as the information flow from direct 
property market to securitized property market. In a later study, Sing (2004) examines 
the relationship between the performance of securitized real estate companies and 
movements in the direct real estate market using property stocks and direct property 
assets. He concludes that the two markets are segmented based on the evidence of 
different premia for different macroeconomic risk factors. 
The correlations of direct real estate market and securitized real estate market are 
examined at the macro level in the above works. This study investigates the linkage of 
property market and capital market at the micro or firm level. The linkage is 
established through the corporate event of property transaction. A REIT’s portfolio of 
properties is valued in the direct market using cap rates while the REIT is valued as a 
whole using dividend yield in the capital market. Upon a property disposition, the 
direct market valuation of that property is manifested. The comparison of the cap rate 
with the dividend yield reflects the difference of the two market valuations, and 
subsequently affects shareholder values.     
In summary, this study further develops the works on REITs property transactions by 
examining the role of sale price in influencing the shareholder values of property 
dispositions. The sale price is indirectly measured by the cap rate. The utilization of 
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cap rate not only enables the comparison of sale prices, but also provides a means of 
measuring the yield change of a REIT’s portfolio and a linkage of the property market 
and the capital market.  
The motivation and the use of the sale proceeds of the property disposition are also 
examined in this study. We control for the strategic considerations of asset 
divestitures addressed in the corporate finance literature to see whether the efficiency 
hypothesis, the focusing hypothesis or the financing hypothesis explains property 
dispositions.    
There is limited research in REITs property transactions. The existing studies in 
REITs property dispositions lack a comprehensive examination of how well the 
conventional asset sales hypotheses explain REITs property dispositions. And most 
importantly, the price revelation associated with property dispositions are left out 
when analyzing the wealth effects. This study aims to fill in this gap and help to 
improve the understanding in asset dispositions. The REIT industry serves as a very 
appropriate laboratory for studying the impacts of sale price on wealth effects of 
property dispositions, since property transactions are more measurable than most 
corporate asset sell-offs.   
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses & Methodology 
This chapter develops three testable hypotheses and specifies the prevailing 
methodology used to assess wealth effects, which is event study. It begins with the 
development of hypotheses. And then introduce the classical event study 
methodology. In order to account for cases where there is events clustering, It 
presents the event parameter model. This is followed by an explanation of the method 
used to select event dates, estimation window and event periods. In addition, a cross-
sectional model used to capture the sources of wealth effects is defined. 
3.1 Hypotheses  
We develop three testable hypotheses to examine whether REITs property disposition 
announcements generate positive abnormal returns and to identify the possible new 
sources of value gains. 
 Hypothesis 1: Divesting REITs abnormal returns at the initial disposition 
announcement are positively related to the difference between the overall market cap 
rate and the transaction cap rate. 
Private real estate market is far from perfect compared to asset markets. Asset markets 
are characterized by perfect competition and price revelation. In asset markets, all 
transactions are done at the true market value, which is revealed by the transaction 
prices of perfect substitutes continuously. In contrast, commercial real estate markets 
are characterized as illiquid, inefficient in information, and segmented. In such 
markets where transactions are thin, the true market value of a transacted property is 
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not readily observable. In consequence, the comparison of deal conditions of the 
current transacted property with the overall market transactions will be enlightening.    
In real estate market, the individual properties are heterogeneous in size and 
characteristics. The property values or prices cannot be compared directly. However, 
there is an easier way to carry out this comparison by calculating per dollar of current 
net operating income (NOI). It is done by dividing NOI by the property value or price, 
and hence getting capitalization rate. In property market, and especially the 
commercial property market, the term capitalization rate is widely used to describe 
property values and prices. The cap rate is the inverse of price-earnings multiple. It is 
also known as the yield, which is the amount of income the investor receives per 
dollar of value invested.  
                                                                                           (3.1) 
Cap rate is an inverse measure of the property value, and movements in cap rates and 
changes in property values are interlinked. A drop in cap rates indicates a rise in 
property value and/or a fall in NOI, and changes in property price cause cap rate to 
move. For a transacted property, a lower cap rate indicates the buyer’s willingness to 
pay a relatively large amount for per dollar of current NOI while a higher cap rate 
indicates the reverse.  
When a property is disposed of, the information conveyed to the market is not only 
the value of the current disposed property but also the relative deal conditions as 
compared to the overall market conditions. Cap rate serves as a measure for this 
comparison. Real estate cap rates are traced period by period to evaluate market 
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conditions. For instance, Real Capital Analytics (RCA) provides the monthly 
transaction-based cap rate averages from 2001 to 2009.  
A large body of research focuses on explaining the determinants of the variations of 
cap rates over time and across property types. Instead of asking about the 
determinants, we use the average of the overall market transaction-based cap rates as 
a benchmark for comparison. It is worth mentioning that the optimal benchmark for 
this comparison should be based on the geographical cap rates. However, there are no 
reported cap rates available at the geographical level. Thus we use the average of the 
overall market cap rates as a benchmark. We compare the realized cap rate in a 
property disposition with the average of the overall market transacted cap rates of the 
same property type. A lower transaction cap rate than the overall market cap rate 
indicates that a property is sold at a higher price than the other transacted properties of 
the same type for a given NOI. In contrast, a higher transaction cap rate than the 
overall market cap rate indicates that a property is sold at a lower price than the other 
transacted properties. A higher sale price (lower cap rate) is good news for investors 
of the divesting REITs. Thus we expect that upon a property disposition 
announcement, the higher the difference between the overall market cap rate and the 
transaction cap rate, the higher the divesting REITs’ abnormal returns as well.  
However, some limitations of this approach need to be highlighted. The comparison 
of the transacted cap rate with the overall market cap rate does not differentiate the 
locations of the properties. This may cover the risk factors. Difference in risk may 
result in difference in the cap rates of two property transactions. One way to wipe out 
the influence of risk factors is to build the comparison by providing a disposition that 
matches the current disposition in the nearest location. But such matched disposition 
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is not available for each disposition. Even there is a closely matched disposition the 
cap rate of that disposition may not be disclosed. Thus direct comparison of two 
closely matched property dispositions becomes impossible. In consequence, we use 
the overall market cap rate as a basis for this comparison. The average of the market 
transacted cap rate can capture the average risk of the same property type in the 
country.  
The second factor that may result in differences in cap rates but not captured in the 
comparison is the possibility that a transaction is a “distressed” sale. Distressed sales 
include liquidation sales and sales as a part of bankruptcy proceedings. Sellers of a 
distressed sale may exhibit impatience and consequently reduce the negotiated sale 
price. Another concern is that the detail of the terms of each transaction is not 
observable but may affect sale price.  
Hypothesis 2: Shareholders welcome the property disposition which is valued higher 
as a single transaction in the direct market than the REIT valued as a portfolio in the 
capital market. 
REITs were created for the purpose of providing a means for smaller investors to 
make large-scale, income-producing real estate investments. REITs as a kind of 
indirect property investment vehicles are regarded as a proxy for the direct real estate 
investment (Sing and Sng, 2003).  
In direct real estate market, an investor acquires a property to receive rental income. 
Alternatively, an investor can invest in the indirect market, or the capital market, by 
holding shares of equity security of REITs and in consequence receives dividend. The 
rental income and dividend are by nature both cashflows.  
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The integration of the indirect or securitized real estate market with the direct real 
estate market is well studied. Martin and Cook (1991) find prices of securitized real 
estate reflect the market value of underlying real estate assets. Ong (1994) and 
Barkhan and Geltner (1995) find that the securitized real estate markets signal the 
price generating processes in direct real estate market.  
While there is evidence of the integration of two markets at the aggregate level, the 
linkage of the two markets at the micro level, or firm level is rarely documented. In 
this study, we use cap rate and dividend yield as measures of the firm level linkage.  
Cap rate is the property yield in real estate market. The reciprocal of cap rate in 
capital market is dividend yield, which can be seen as capitalization rate in capital 
market. It is represented as the dividend payout divided by the price per share. 
                                   
                                                                                           (3.2) 
 
When a property is disposed of, the realized cap rate reflects how the property is 
valued in the direct real estate market. At the mean time, the REIT that divests the 
property is valued using dividend yield in the capital market.  A REIT’s decision of 
disposing of a property in direct real estate market or keeping the property within the 
REIT’ portfolio to be valued as a whole in the capital market may depend on the 
direct real estate market condition. If REIT disposes of a property in a buoyant market 
at a lower cap rate compared to the REIT’s dividend yield, in other words, if a 
property is disposed of at a higher valuation in the direct market than the REIT 
portfolio valued in the capital market, then the shareholder of the selling REIT will 
benefit from this transaction. 
34 
 
The impact of the difference between transacted cap rate and REIT dividend yield on 
shareholder returns depends on the relative size of the disposition compared to the 
divesting REIT’s size. The larger the relative size is, the more obvious the impact will 
be. Thus, the limitation of this hypothesis is, if a property disposition is relatively 
small to the REIT size, the impact may not be observed.  
Hypothesis 3: (a) Yield dilutive dispositions decrease the average yield of the REIT 
portfolio, hence reduce shareholder returns. (b) Yield dilutive dispositions decrease 
the average risk of the REIT portfolio, hence increase shareholder returns.  
When we consider the impact of the difference between cap rate and dividend yield 
on shareholder returns in Hypothesis 2, we do not take account of the market 
valuation factors in influencing dividend yield. We divide the dividends by share 
price to get dividend yield. However, the capital market may not value the divesting 
REIT at par upon property disposition. It may either value the REIT at discount or at 
premium. If the market value is equal to the net asset value (NAV) for a REIT, we say 
that the REIT is valued at par. If the market value is greater than the NAV, the REIT 
is valued at a premium. In contrast, if the market value is smaller than the NAV, the 
REIT is valued at a discount.  
Table 3.1 summarizes how the capital market value REITs from 2001 to 2009. It 
shows that 80.5% of the REITs in our sample are valued at premium during this 
period.  All the REITs in our sample are valued at premium in 2006, and 95.5% of 
REITs are valued at premium in 2005. In 2008 and 2009 the percentage of REITs that 
are valued at discount are highest in the nine years, being 55.6% and 36.4% 
respectively. This observation is consistent with the fact that the capital market tend to 
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value companies at premium in a buoyant market while discount the valuation in a 
dark market. 
Table 3.1 The Capital Market Valuation of REITs, 2001-2009 










2001 7 5 71.4 2 28.6 
2002 6 4 66.7 2 33.3 
2003 19 14 73.7 5 26.3 
2004 8 6 75 2 25 
2005 22 21 95.5 1 4.5 
2006 20 20 100 0 0 
2007 11 10 90.9 1 9.1 
2008 11 7 63.6 4 36.4 
2009 9 4 44.4 5 55.6 
Total 113 91 80.5 22 19.5 
 
   Source: Author, 2010 
To control for the capital market valuation effect, we use the market value or the 
portfolio price of a REIT divided by its NAV (P/NAV) as a correct factor. Thus the 
difference in cap rate and dividend/NAV is expressed as (3.3). 
                                                               (3.3) 
 
Looking at the subtrahend of the right hand side, with a consistent dividend payout 
policy, we can express (3.3) in terms of NOI. We use subscripts i and p to 
differentiate the property level and REIT portfolio level values. 
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                                        (3.4) 
 
Since NOI p / NAV represents the yield of the REIT portfolio, (3.4) reflects the 
revenue effect upon a property disposition. Hence when we control for market 
valuation factors, the difference between cap rate and dividend/NAV captures the 
difference between property yield (cap rate) and REIT portfolio yield.  
          Table 3.2 An Example of Yield Dilutive and Accretive Dispositions 







Panel A Yield dilutive disposition   
Asset Value (US$ M) 2000 200 1800 
NOI (US$ M) 140 16 124 
Yield 7.00% 8.00% 6.89%
1 
Panel B Yield accretive disposition   
Asset Value (US$ M) 2000 200 1800 
NOI (US$ M) 140 12 128 
Yield 7.00% 6.00% 7.11% 
       
        Source: Author, 2010 
Upon the disposition of a property, the REIT portfolio yield changes. The disposition 
may either be “dilutive” by reducing the yield of the existing portfolio, or “accretive” 
by resulting in an increase in the yield of the existing portfolio. If the yield of a 
disposed property is larger than the REIT portfolio yield, the yield of the remaining 
portfolio will decrease after disposition. In contrast, if the yield of a disposed property 
is smaller than the REIT portfolio yield, the yield of the remaining portfolio will 
                                                            
1 If the yield of a disposed property (US$16M / US$200M = 8%) is larger than the portfolio yield (US$ 
140M / US$ 2000M = 7%), then the average yield of the remaining REIT portfolio would decrease to 
6.89% {(US$140M - US$16 M) / (US$2000 M - US$200 M)} after the property disposition. 
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increase. Table 3.2 illustrates the mechanics of the yield dilutive and accretive 
dispositions. 
On the acquisition side, Reiss and Pizak (2000) posit that shareholders will approve 
an acquisition or merger proposition if only they believe that the transaction will 
result in increasing in growth, cash flow, dividends and share price. In other words, an 
acquisition or merger must be accretive by nature to be acceptable by existing 
shareholders of the acquiring REIT. Ooi, Ong and Neo (2009) describe a property 
acquisition as “accretive” if it results in an increase in the overall yield of the 
acquiring REIT’s property portfolio, and as “dilutive” if it leads to a decrease in the 
portfolio yield. They find that the yield accretive acquisitions contribute to 
shareholder returns in Asian REITs property acquisitions.  
In this study we look at the yield accretive and dilutive nature of property 
dispositions. Since yield dilutive dispositions are bad news for shareholders, we 
expect to see the larger the difference between the transacted property yield and REIT 
portfolio yield, the lower the shareholder returns will be.  
However, the proponents of the yield theory fail to highlight the risk factors 
associated with property transactions. The higher incomes and dividends generated by 
yield accretive acquisitions come at the expense of exposing the shareholders to 
higher risks. The lower incomes and dividends generated by the yield dilutive 
dispositions benefit the shareholders by lowering the overall risk exposing to them. 
Hence, if we take account for the risk factors, we expect that the yield dilutive 
dispositions increase shareholder returns by decreasing the average risk of the REIT’s 
remaining portfolio.  
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The yield story and the risk story explain the wealth effects of property dispositions in 
the opposite directions. We seek to find which one dominates in affecting shareholder 
returns. 
To summarize, we believe that the cap rate of a disposed property carries important 
information for the evaluation of the divesting REIT. We propose three hypotheses 
related to cap rate. Firstly, we look at the relationship of the transacted cap rate with 
the overall market cap rate, and propose that the shareholder returns are negatively 
related to the difference between the market cap rate and the transacted cap rate. 
Secondly, we compare the cap rate of a property disposition with the divesting REIT’s 
dividend yield. If the cap rate is lower than the dividend yield, then the property is 
valued higher in direct property market than the REIT portfolio valued in capital 
market. We expect that the lower the cap rate compared to dividend yield, the higher 
the shareholder returns upon property disposition. Lastly, we characterize the 
accretive and dilutive nature of a property transaction and hypothesize that yield 
dilutive dispositions either reduce shareholder returns or increase shareholder returns 
by lowering risk.  
The three hypotheses involve the following three key cap rate difference variables. (1) 
transacted cap rate – market cap rate; (2) transacted cap rate – dividend yield; (3) 
transacted cap rate – portfolio yield. 
 
3.2 Event Study Methodology  
The analysis of the wealth effects of REITs property dispositions employs event study 
methodology which relies on the efficiency of the stock market and works by 
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identifying the changes in the relevant stock prices with the news concerning the 
event.   
In real estate research, the event study methodology has been widely applied to 
analyze equity issuing and corporate acquisitions and divestitures. It is used to 
measure the abnormal security price adjustment around firm-specific event 
announcements. These studies include Hite, Owers and Rogers (1984), Owers and 
Rogers (1986), Allen and Sirmans (1987), Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1989 
and 1991), McIntosh, Ott and Liang (1995) and Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 
(2006). 
The following two classical works of event studies introduce the event study 
methodology that is essentially used in today’s research. Ball and Brown (1968) 
analyze the information content of earnings, and Fama, et al. (1969) examines the 
effects on stock splits after removing the effects of simultaneous dividend increases.  
Fama (1970) provides the efficient market hypothesis, which is incorporated in event 
studies to define the relationship between information and prices or return of 
securities traded in the stock market in order to measure abnormal returns. 
Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the major concern in event study is to measure 
to what extent the stock price performance around the announcement of the event can 
be attributed as abnormal, given a model that determines equilibrium expected 
returns. They state that, if an event is unanticipated, the magnitude of abnormal 
performance at the time the event actually occurs is a measure of the wealth effect of 
that event. This abnormality complies with the market efficiency hypothesis as it 
assesses how rapidly stock prices adjust to new information and how only investors 
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who are able to predict the event occurrence with certainty will achieve the abnormal 
returns.  
The models used for measuring normal performance in event studies to determine the 
equilibrium expected returns of securities include the constant-mean-return model, 
market model, statistical models and economic models. 
The market model relates the return of any security to the return of the market 
portfolio. As such, the variations in the returns of a security can be attributed to 
market-specific events that affect the entire market, and firm-related events that affect 
only its security return. The market slope (β) in the model is assumed to isolate firm-
specific events and account for only market-specific events, while the residuals of the 
model reflects the firm-related events. The slope and the intercept terms of the model 
should be constant over the period during which the model is fitted into the data. 
Otherwise, the model estimators (standard deviation and variance) generated by the 
model will be biased and inefficient, and the results will not provide an appropriate 
basis for making statements about the information content of the announcement or 
market efficiency (Fabozzi and Francis, 1978, Larcker, Gordon, and Pinches, 1980, 
McDonald and Nichols,1984). 
The traditional event study methodology involves a two-step estimation procedure. 
The first step requires the estimation of intercept (α) and slope (β) using an ordinary 
least squares regression. However, it is important to distinguish between the 
estimation and event period. The majority of event studies have used pre-event period 
as their estimation period, and have pre-determined the number of observations for 
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the estimation. The most popular model for the purpose of the first step is the single-
index market model (SIMM) as shown below. 
                                                                                      (3.5)                                         
where: 
  Rjt = rate of return on security j at time t; 
 Rmt = rate of return on the market portfolio at time t; 
 βj = slope of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimate, which is estimated 
as E(Rjt, Rmt)/E
2
(Rmt), where E(Rjt, Rmt) is the covariance between Rjt and Rmt, and 
E
2
(Rmt) is the market variance;  
αj = OLS estimate of intercept term; and  
εjt = the residual return of security j at time t. 
The regression model (3.5) represents the stock price behavior as if there are no 
shocks of the controlled event. Ina following stage, the prediction error or abnormal 
return (ARjt) for every day t, which is defined as the actual stock return (Rjt) minus the 
predicted return ( jt ), and the cumulative abnormal return (CARjt) over the event 
window, t = [t1, t2]   are computed. For a single security j, the ARjt and CARjt can be 
represented in Equation (3.6) and (3.7) respectively. 
                                                             (3.6) 
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                                                                                                                        (3.7)         
 
3.3 Empirical Method  
3.3.1 Event Parameter Model 
In this thesis, we replicate the event parameter model used in Campbell, Lo and 
Mackinley (1997). As recommended by Campbell, Lo and Mackinley (1997), the 
two-stage estimation process can be consolidated into a one stage multivariate 
regression model. This model contains dummy variables to handle cases where there 
is partial clustering. Partial clustering is where the event date is not the same across 
firms but there is an overlap in the event windows. In addition, this method also 
allows the investigator to obtain test statistics, which is consistent with the wide body 
of accepted econometric theory. This model, as shown by Equation (3.8), is known as 
the “event parameter model” and is done by adding a vector of (0, 1) dummy to the 
right-hand side of the SIMM in Equation (3.5). Hence, K is the number of events 
included in the estimation, while the dummy variable (Dek) represents the specific 
event date within the event window [t1, t2], and is indicated by 1 for the event date, e 
  [t1, t1 - 1, . . ., -1, 0, 1, . . . t2 - 1, t2] and 0 elsewhere. This method is developed in 
papers of Schipper and Thompson (1983), Collins and Dent (1984) and Malatesta and 
Thompson (1985), and has later been applied to many empirical studies.   




  Rjt =  rate of return on security j at period t; 
 Rmt =  rate of return on the market portfolio at period t; 
    αj =  OLS estimate of intercept term; 
    βj =  slope of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimate;    
    εjt = the residual return of security j at period t; and 
   γek =  estimated coefficient for dummy variable Dek, which is equivalent to the 
abnormal  return (ARjt) of security j on e-th day of the k-th event window. 
Consequently, for a stock j, the cumulative abnormal return (CARjt) over the event 
window period in Equation (3.7) can be rewritten as: 
                                                                                                    (3.9) 
For a sample of N events, the average abnormal return (ARe) for each time e can be 
represented as: 
                                                                                                                      (3.10) 
The average cumulative abnormal return (CARe) for N events over an event window 
e= [t1, t2] can then be computed as in Equation (3.11): 
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                                                                                      (3.11) 
To test the significance of the measured abnormal returns, we construct the J2 
statistics for the e-th day of the event windows as detailed in Campbell et al. (1997): 
                                                                        (3.12) 
3.3.2 Selection of Events Dates, Estimation and Event Periods 
For the event study, we define an event to be the disposition of one or more properties 
on a single day by a public listed equity REIT. A 21-day event window surrounding 
the announcement (Day -10 to Day +10) is employed with the date of the announcement 
designated as Day 0. An estimation window of 100 days prior to the event to 10 days 
after the event is employed. When a REIT disposes of more than one property on 
dates less than 100 days apart, the estimation windows for the divesting REIT are 
combined so that one market model would apply to these consecutive periods. 
3.3.3 Cross-sectional Regression 
After the event study, we employ cross-sectional regressions to further assess the 
market reaction to property disposition announcements. The basic regression model is 
set up as follows: Y is defined as an (N x 1) vector of observations and X as an (N x K) 
matrix of characteristics. The regression equation is as follows: Y = α+βX +ε, where β 
is the (K x 1) coefficient vector and ε is the (N x 1) disturbance vector. Assuming E[X 
' ε] = 0, we can consistently estimate β using OLS. The dependent variable in all the 
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regressions is the 3-day CAR (-1, +1) earned by the divesting REIT’s stock. The 
independent variables are a set of explanatory variables that may potentially 
contribute to the abnormal returns. 
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Character 4 Research Data 
Our data set is analyzed in this chapter. Section 4.1 presents the source of the data 
utilized in this study. Section 4.2 gives a report of the sample description. Section 4.3 
describes the trends of cap rate and dividend yield in the period of 2001-2009. 
4.1 Data Source 
The sample for this study consists of 78 public-listed U.S. equity REITs that make 
property dispositions covering a period from January 2001 to December 2009. We 
obtain the list of REITs and its transactions from Real Capital Analytics (RCA) 
database and SNL Financial database. SNL provides the following information 
regarding the property dispositions. It covers the date of the disposition, the REIT’s 
ownership structure of the property, disposition price of the property, location of the 
property, existence of portfolio disposition and its portfolio price, property type and 
physical size of the property. RCA covers more information on property dispositions. 
It includes transactions made by both currently listed and delisted REITs. Other than 
the information that can be obtained from SNL, it covers additional information on 
the transaction cap rate for some of the dispositions.
2
 RCA collects cap rates from a 
variety of sources including property buyers, sellers, brokers and press. The cap rate 
that RCA reports is the initial annual un-leveraged return on a transacted property. It 
measures the NOI produced by a property and its capital cost or the original 
transaction price. From RCA we can get cap rates for approximately 30% of the 
dispositions that covered by SNL. Transaction cap rate is key information utilized in 
                                                            
2 We do not include all dispositions with cap rate information covered by RCA data, since we can only 
get the announcements for approximately 20% of the dispositions. The dispositions that we cannot get 
the disposition announcements are not included in the sample. 
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this research. The realized cap rate of the property disposition is obtained from the 
RCA property transaction data and the announcement itself. The overall market cap 
rate from 2001 to 2009 is obtained from RCA.  
We extract the daily stock returns for individual REITs and the market index from 
Thomson Datastream database. For the market proxy, the S&P Mid Cap Index is used 
in this study.
3
 As we carry out cross-sectional analysis following the event study, we 
also gather the following data. We retrieve the quarterly and yearly data on the 
financial characteristics of the individual REITs from SNL Financial database.  
We obtain the event information and announcement date from Dow Jones Factiva and 
LexisNexis database. The date at which the disposition first appears on the relevant 
secondary data is referred as the announcement date or event day. If different dates 
are observed from the various data retrieved from Dow Jones Factiva, LexisNexis, 
RCA and SNL Financial, the earliest date reflected will be taken as the event day. If 
the disposition is announced on a non-trading day, the next trading day after the 
announcement is used as the event day. In cases where there are more than one 
property being involved in a disposition announcement, the value of the disposed 
properties are combined and regarded as a single event. Transactions for which the 
total value is less than $20 million are excluded. After the data treatment, the final 
sample consists of a total of 213 estimation equations, covering 288 dispositions 
transacted by 78 U.S. public-listed REITs from January 2001 to December 2009.  
 
                                                            
3 Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) suggest that the benchmark regressions are a 
better fit to S&P Midcap index than S&P 500 index.  
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4.2 Sample Description 
In this section, we describe our data by two samples. One is the entire sample with 
288 dispositions and the other is the sample with cap rate information disclosed, 
which has 113 dispositions. The number of dispositions in the cap rate sample is 
about 40% of that in the entire sample. 
Table 4.1 Distribution of REITs Property Disposition Announcements 






Average Deal Size 
(Million USD) 
2001 25 1,724.0 69.0 
2002 19 1,422.1 74.8 
2003 35 3,517.8 100.5 
2004 28 2,864.9 102.3 
2005 47 3,577.6 76.1 
2006 45 6,050.5 134.5 
2007 44 5,356.1 121.7 
2008 30 3,051.2 101.7 
2009 15 1,017.9 67.9 
Total 288 28,582.0 99.2 






Average Deal Size  
(Million USD) 
2001 7 232.1 33.2 
2002 6 258.4 43.1 
2003 19 1,426.5 75.1 
2004 8 845.5 105.7 
2005 22 1,519.6 69.1 
2006 20 3,791.0 189.5 
2007 11 1251.0 113.7 
2008 11 945.7 86.0 
2009 9 679.5 75.5 
Total 113 10,949.2 96.9 
 Source: Author, 2010 
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Table 4.1 summarizes the observations included in the sample of 288 disposition 
events. It presents the distribution of events by calendar year.  The total value of the 
288 transactions is approximately US$ 28.6 billion, and the average size of the 
dispositions is US$ 99.2 million, ranging from US$ 20 million to US$ 1,086 million. 
In both samples, dispositions took place in a high frequency in 2005 and 2006. The 
number of dispositions decreases from 2007. The observations in these two samples 
are consistent with the overall property transaction trend. 
Table 4.2 reports the frequency of property disposition occurrence for the entire 
sample. About 70% of REITs engage in multiple property dispositions from 2001 to 
2009, and near 18% of REITs dispose of properties more than 6 times in this time 
period.  
Table 4.2 Frequency of Disposition Occurrence for the Entire Sample 
Occurrence Number of REITs % of Events % of REITs 
1 25 8.7 32.1 
2 17 11.8 21.8 
3 11 11.5 14.1 
4 7 9.7 9.0 
5 4 6.9 5.1 
6 or more 14 51.4 17.9 
Total 78 100 100 
Source: Author, 2010 
Table 4.3 presents the breakdown of the sample of 78 U.S. public-listed REITs by 
their subsector classification as well as the number of transaction each segment 
contributes. Overall, retail REITs dominate the sample with 24 out of the 78 REITs 
included, while residential REITs make the most transactions, making up 35.4% of 
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the total transactions. In the subsample with cap rate information, office REITs 
dominate the 45 REITs, taking 35.6%. Residential REITs still make most 
transactions.  
Table 4.3 Breakdown of Divesting REITs by Subsector Type 








Office 18 23.1 77 26.7 
Industrial 3 3.8 4 1.4 
Residential 16 20.5 102 35.4 
Retail 24 30.8 57 19.8 
Diversified 6 7.7 20 6.9 
Other 11 14.1 28 9.7 
Total 78 100 288 100 








Office 16 35.6 34 30.1 
Industrial 1 2.2 1 0.9 
Residential 10 26.7 42 37.2 
Retail 10 22.2 20 17.7 
Diversified 3 6.7 8 7.1 
Other 5 6.7 8 7.1 
Total 45 100 113 100 
  Source: Author, 2010 
Table 4.4 describes the composition and completeness of the sample used in this 
study. In order to eliminate the issue of selection bias, we include property 
dispositions done by REITs that delisted before 2009 in our sample as well. This 
sample does not include all the listed equity REITs. This is because either there is no 
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transaction data of some REITs or with transaction data the REITs did not make 
disposition announcements in the press.  
    Table 4.4 The Composition of the Listed REITs and the Delisted REITs 
 
No. of Listed 
REITs 




No. of Delisted 
REITs 




Office 9 56.3 9 47.4 
Industrial 2 25.0 1 20.0 
Residential 12 92.3 4 44.4 
Retail 21 72.4 3 14.3 
Diversified 5 45.5 1 20.0 
Other 9 24.3 2 8.0 
Total 58 50.9 20 23.8 
Source: Author, 2010 
The residential is the most complete REIT type in our sample, covering 92.3% of the 
total currently listed residential REITs and 44.4% of the delisted residential REITs. 
The number of property dispositions by delisted REITs in our sample is relatively 
small in comparison with that of currently listed REITs. The 20 delisted REITs in this 
sample take about 24% of the total REITs that delisted from 2001 to 2009.  
Property disposition announcements provide information on the date of the 
disposition, the location of the property and the disposition price. In addition, most 
REITs also report the motivation of the disposition and the use of the sale proceeds. 
The following descriptions of the use of the proceeds are cited from the 
announcements. “Proceeds from the sale will be used for a section 1031 tax-deferred 
exchange, to pay down debt and/or to fund redevelopment activities within the core 
                                                            
4 This includes all currently listed equity REITs in SNL REITs list. 




portfolio.” “The company will use sale proceeds from the two properties to repay 
debt, fund future investments and developments, and buy back stock.” From the 
announcements we find that the different types of usage of the sale proceeds are not 
mutually exclusive, which means that the proceeds may be used for more than one 
purpose. 
Table 4.5 sums up the information type and its frequency of occurrence within the 
disposition announcements. The information types that appear most frequently in the 
data include retiring debt and reinvesting (funding new acquisitions). 
 Table 4.5 Breakdown of Dispositions by Information Type 
Panel A Break Down of 288 Dispositions in the Entire Sample   
Information Type N % 
Reduce Debt 99 34.4 
Increase Focus 31 10.8 
Reinvest 100 34.7 
1031 exchange 26 9 
Stock Repurchase 15 5.2 
Not stated 92 31.9 
Total Events 288  
Panel A Break Down of 113 Dispositions in the Cap Rate Sample 
Information Type N % 
Reduce Debt 40 35.4 
Increase Focus 19 16.8 
Reinvest 35 31 
1031 exchange 11 9.7 
Stock Repurchase 8 7.1 
Not stated 32 28.3 
Total Events 113  
Source: Author, 2010 
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Panel A Information Type by Year    
 RDEBT FOCUS REINV EXCH SREP 
2001 7 5 9 2 2 
2002 3 3 5 1 0 
2003 14 5 13 4 5 
2004 11 4 10 1 0 
2005 19 5 23 5 0 
2006 12 5 23 5 0 
2007 18 2 13 8 1 
2008 12 1 4 1 4 
2009 3 1 0 0 0 
Panel B Information Type as % of Dispositions by Year  
 RDEBT FOCUS REINV EXCH SREP 
2001 28 20 36 8 8 
2002 15.8 15.8 26.3 5.3 0 
2003 40 14 37 11 14 
2004 39.3 14.3 35.7 3.6 0 
2005 40.4 10.6 48.9 10.6 0 
2006 26.7 11.1 51.1 11.1 0 
2007 40.9 4.5 29.5 18.2 2.3 
2008 40.0 3.3 13.3 3.3 13.3 
2009 20 7 0 0 0 
 
Note: RDEBT: Reduce Debt 
          FOCUS: Increase Focus 
      
     REINV: Reinvest 
     EXCH: 1031 Exchange 
 
SREP: Repurchase Shares 
 
 
Source: Author, 2010 
 
                                                            
6 Panel A of Table 4.6 describes the frequency of the five information types in each year. Panel B 






We further analyze whether certain type of information appear more frequently than 
other types of information in certain years. Table 4.6 reports the distribution of 
information types by year.  
From Table 4.6 we can see that reinvesting is a dominating type of information in 
2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006. In 2003 and 2004, the frequency of reducing debt is 
slightly higher than reinvesting. In 2007, 2008 and 2009, reducing debt dominates 
other information types. In 2009, there are only two information types, increasing 
focus and reducing debt. The distribution of information types appearing in the 
disposition announcements over year is consistent with the market condition.  
In 2005 and 2006, property transactions are at high level motivated by merger, 
acquisitions and high property valuations. REITs rebuild their portfolio by disposing 
of properties and funding new acquisitions using the proceeds from disposition. 
However, after the crisis, property transactions declined dramatically in 2007. REITs 
focus on improving balance sheet fundamentals and reducing debt after property 
dispositions and limit further acquisitions in a downward market.  
4.3 Description of Cap Rate and Dividend Yield 
Since our first key interest is to examine how the difference between the overall 
market cap rate and the transacted cap rate affects shareholder returns upon property 
disposition, we first look at the trend of the overall market cap rate in the period of 
2001-2009. Table 4.7 shows the average overall market cap rate by year. It includes 




 Table 4.7 The Average Market Cap Rates by Property Type 
 All Office Residential Retail Industrial 
2001 9.3% 9.1% 8.5% 9.7% 9.5% 
2002 8.9% 8.8% 8.2% 9.3% 9.5% 
2003 8.3% 8.4% 7.5% 8.5% 9.0% 
2004 7.6% 7.6% 6.9% 7.9% 8.4% 
2005 7.0% 7.0% 6.2% 7.4% 7.8% 
2006 6.7% 6.6% 6.0% 7.0% 7.3% 
2007 6.5% 5.8% 6.1% 6.7% 6.9% 
2008 6.8% 6.3% 6.4% 7.2% 7.4% 
2009 7.2% 7.2% 6.8% 7.6% 8.2% 
 
Source: RCA 
     
 

















   
    Source: RCA 
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Figure 4.1 describes the trends of the cap rates of all property types and the sub-
sectors of office, residential, retail and industrial. Property values rose (the cap rate 
fell) from 2001 to about 2007, and fell (the cap rate rose) from 2007 to 2009. We can 
also see from Figure 4.1 that cap rates are not the same for each property type, but 
vary over time. This mainly results from the different growth expectations and 
differences in risk premiums for different property types. Of all the property types, 
cap rate of residential properties is the lowest while that of industrial is the highest. 
We then compare the overall market cap rate trend and the cap rate trend of our 
disposition sample from January 2001 to December 2009. Figure 4.2 gives this 
comparison. The yearly market cap rate used in this figure is the average of the 
twelfth months cap rates in each year. The transaction cap rate is the average value of 
the cap rates disclosed for property dispositions in each year.  This figure gives four 
groups of comparisons of market cap rate and the transaction cap rate, which are all 
property type cap rate, cap rate of the subsector of office, residential and retail. In all 
of these four groups, the market cap rate and the transaction cap rate share the same 
trend in this period, though the market cap rate is smoother. For all property types and 
each subsector, the cap rates show a downward trend from 2001 to 2007 and an 
upward trend after 2007. This trend is consistent with the property market 
fundamentals that property values rose (the cap rate fell) from 2001 through about 






































































Market Cap_Retail Transaction Cap_Retail
 
Source: Author, 2010 
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Table 4.8 describes the average values of market cap rate and the transacted cap rate 
in our sample for each year. We test whether the cap rate in our sample is 
significantly different from the market cap rate. This table shows that the average cap 
rate in our sample is not statistically different from average market cap rate in most of 
the years except for 2005 and 2008.  In 2008, there is an outlier value of 2.9% in our 
transacted cap rates, which results in the significant lower average cap rate in our 
sample. In 2005, the average cap rate in our sample is different from average market 
cap rate at 10% significant level. This also results from some extreme lower values of 
transacted cap rate in our sample. Six out of twenty-two property dispositions are 
transacted at cap rates between 3% and 4%. 
 Table 4.8 Mean Test of the Market and the Sample Cap Rate 
  Market Cap Sample Cap H0: Cap Differ = 0 
  Mean Observations Mean Observations t value p value 
2001 9.2% 12 8.7% 7 1.39 0.18 
2002 8.9% 12 9.2% 6 -0.68 0.50 
2003 8.2% 12 8.0% 19 0.78 0.44 
2004 7.6% 12 7.2% 8 0.72 0.48 
2005 7.0% 12 6.0% 22 (1.75)* 0.09 
2006 6.7% 12 6.6% 20 0.10 0.92 
2007 6.5% 12 6.0% 11 1.19 0.25 
2008 6.8% 12 6.0% 11 (2.15)** 0.04 
2009 7.3% 12 7.7% 9 -1.62 0.13 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
Source: Author, 2010      
 
Our second key interest is to examine how the difference between transacted cap rate 
and dividend yield affects shareholder returns upon property disposition. Thus we 
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compare the dividend yield in our sample with the market equity REITs dividend 
yield. We also compare the trend of difference between cap rate and dividend yield in 
our sample with the market trend of this difference, to see whether our sample can 
represent the market trend in this time period. Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 
show these comparisons. From Figure 4.3 we can see that the dividend yield in our 
sample reflect the market trend in large in the period of 2001-2009.  






















Dividend Yield_Market Dividend Yield_Sample
 
Source: Author, 2010 
Table 4.9 describes the average values of market dividend yield and the divesting 
REITs’ dividend yield for each year. We compare the two average values to see 
whether there is significant difference in these two average values in certain year. 
Except for year 2001, the average values of the two dividend yields are not 
significantly different. In 2001, four out of seven or 57% of divesting REITs have 
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dividend yield between 5% and 6%, while the average market dividend yield is 7.4%. 
This leads to a significant difference between the average dividend yield in our 
sample and the average market dividend yield in 2001. 
Table 4.9 Mean Test of the Market and the Sample Dividend Yield 
  Market Dividend Yield Sample Dividend Yield H0: DY Differ = 0 
  Mean Observations Mean Observations t value p value 
2001 7.3% 12 6.4% 7 (2.02)* 0.06 
2002 6.7% 12 7.3% 6 -1.54 0.14 
2003 6.4% 12 6.5% 19 -0.21 0.84 
2004 4.7% 12 5.2% 8 0.03 0.98 
2005 4.0% 12 5.5% 22 -1.66 0.11 
2006 4.1% 12 4.0% 20 -0.08 0.93 
2007 5.8% 12 5.0% 11 -1.42 0.17 
2008 5.8% 12 8.3% 11 -1.64 0.12 
2009 7.8% 12 9.2% 9 -0.68 0.51 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Source: Author, 2010 
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 describe the difference between cap rate and dividend yield 
in our sample and the market trend of this difference, respectively.  These two figures 
show that the difference between cap rate and dividend yield in our sample reflects 
the market trend of this difference in the sample period.  The overall market trend is 
that cap rate is higher than dividend yield, with exception in 2009, in which dividend 
yield is above cap rate. In our sample, the dividend yield is above cap rate in two 
consecutive years of 2008 and 2009.  Figure 4.6 describes the spread of cap rate and 
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7 Market cap rate is the average of the monthly cap rate in each year reported by RCA, and dividend 
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Source: Author, 2010 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Results 
By empirically examining the wealth effects of U.S. equity REITs property 
dispositions from 2001 to 2009, this chapter provides an extensive investigation in 
whether property dispositions increase shareholder values. The evaluation process is 
divided into two parts. First, we get the abnormal returns using event study. Then, we 
carry out cross-sectional regressions to further analyze the sources of the abnormal 
returns.  
5.1 Abnormal Returns 
In this section, we present the empirical results of the event study. Table 5.1 reports 
the abnormal returns for the total sample of 288 disposition announcements. It reports 
the average abnormal return (AR) over the 21-day window period and also the 
average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for four different intervals.  
The average abnormal returns on the event day (D0) and on the day before the event 
day (D-1) are 0.18% and 0.14% respectively. The significant positive excess return on 
the day before the event day (D-1) may be due to information revelation in the market 















J Statistic Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
-10 -0.25% -1.60 4.18% -0.11% -17.15% 9.27% 
-9 0.03% -0.05 2.30% -0.03% -3.60% 6.61% 
-8 0.07% -1.28 2.86% 0.22% -6.92% 8.17% 
-7 0.15% -0.54 2.31% 0.44% -11.32% 6.86% 
-6 -0.03% 1.27 2.13% -0.32% -7.06% 4.24% 
-5 0.05% 0.18 3.14% 0.22% -8.40% 6.48% 
-4 -0.17% -1.39 2.79% -0.11% -8.69% 7.10% 
-3 0.02%* 2.10 2.16% -0.18% -5.01% 5.38% 
-2 -0.02% -0.55 3.26% 0.21% -14.95% 6.63% 
-1 0.14%* 2.42 2.71% 0.03% -7.95% 5.59% 
0 0.18%* 2.39 2.61% -0.16% -8.36% 28.82% 
1 -0.06% -0.85 2.26% -0.13% -4.56% 4.48% 
2 -0.29% -0.06 2.83% -0.36% -14.08% 3.82% 
3 -0.17%* -2.12 2.94% 0.03% -7.89% 9.04% 
4 -0.09% 0.32 2.49% 0.20% -6.89% 5.45% 
5 0.06% -0.75 1.88% 0.23% -4.28% 6.65% 
6 0.00% 0.09 2.28% 0.04% -4.20% 4.65% 
7 0.05% -0.18 3.14% -0.09% -6.95% 8.90% 
8 -0.06% 0.40 2.75% 0.03% -7.60% 6.29% 
9 0.05% -1.02 2.82% 0.35% -23.55% 5.89% 
10 -0.14% -1.39 3.13% -0.05% -9.00% 6.81% 
-10,+10 -0.37%* -3.22 8.77% -0.05% -46.17% 31.44% 
-10,-1 -0.01%* -1.45 5.85% -0.19% -34.78% 32.58% 
0,+10 -0.46%* -10.04 5.79% -0.34% -30.70% 23.72% 
-1,+1 0.26%* 7.51 3.38% 0.02% -8.81% 28.73% 
*denotes statistical significance at 5% level or higher. 




The trend of the abnormal returns points out that most of the announcement effects 
are significantly captured on the day before the event and on the event day itself. The 
CAR(-1, +1) is 0.26% and is statistically significant. The abnormal returns across the 
other three windows are found to be negative. This means that the positive effect 
cannot be captured ten days prior to the disposition announcement and also do not 
impose a longer influence as to ten days after the disposition announcement. As a 
result, we focus on analyzing the 3-day CAR(-1, +1) following the event study. The 
abnormal return on the day after the event day is negative but insignificant. We 
included it in the following analysis to capture a better reflection of the whole 
announcement effect.  

































































Source: Author, 2010 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 track the average ARs and CARs, respectively, for the 
sample over the corresponding 21-day window period. 
The 3-day average abnormal returns CAR(-1, +1) is reported to be 0.26% and 
statistically significant. This finding is congruous with previous works by Campbell, 
Petrova and Sirmans (2006) on sell-offs by REITs, and Glascock, Davidson and 
Sirmans (1991) on conventional firms that sell real estate assets. Hence, we can 
conclude from the results that the disposition announcements contribute to a positive 
stock price adjustment for the divesting REITs. The magnitude of the 3-day CAR may 
be relatively small as compared to Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006), who 
reported a 0.8% CAR. The potential reason is that seller abnormal returns are 
increasing in the relative size of the divested assets (Klein, 1986, Mulherin and 
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Boone, 2000). In Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans study, the average ratio of the 
disposed property to the REITs size is 0.07, ranging from 0.01 to 1.04. In this study, 
the average ratio is 0.04, ranging from 0.001 to 0.61. Thus the relative small CAR is 
reasonable.  
It is also worth noticing that the majority of the REITs in our sample were actively 
engaged in a multiple disposition program. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) 
argue that when firms make multiple bids as part of an announced acquisition 
program, any finding of significant abnormal returns at an acquisition announcement 
is notable since the impact of the acquisitions is already capitalized in the stock price. 
Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1991) discovered that the gains for buyers were 
only observed in cases of single purchase but not multiple purchases. Fuller, Netter 
and Stegemoller’s argument and Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans’s evidence explain 
the relative small CAR observed in REITs property dispositions in this study.  
5.2 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
5.2.1 Results of the Entire Sample and the Cap Rate Sample 
The event study results show that disposition announcement leads to a positive stock 
price adjustment for the disposing REIT. The pattern of the abnormal returns indicates 
that most of the announcement effects are significantly captured on the event day and 
one day before the event. To further investigate the determinants of the abnormal 
returns associated with property dispositions, we focus our analysis on the 3-day 
CAR(-1, +1) subsequently. We employ a cross-sectional regression of the 3-day CAR 
against a set of potential explanatory variables.  
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We run four regressions. In the first regression for the entire sample, we regress the 3-
day CAR against a set of variables suggested by existing disposition literature, but the 
three cap rate difference variables are not included. In the following three regressions, 
we add the three key variables as defined in the first section, respectively. In the 
second regression, we add the key variable of market cap rate and the transaction cap 
rate difference. In the third regression, we further add the transaction cap rate and 
REIT’s dividend yield difference. In the fourth regression, we add the property yield 
and the REIT portfolio yield difference. The other variables discussed above all 
appear in these two regressions as well. 
The four regressions are listed as follow: 
 
 
   
 
Where Xj is a vector of the control variables suggested by existing disposition 
literature, and Skj (k=1, 2, 3) are the three cap rate difference variables as defined in 
the three hypotheses.  
The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in Table 5.2. The summary 
statistics for the explanatory variables for the entire sample and the cap rate sample 
are presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively. 
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Table 5.2 Definition of Variables 
Variable Symbol Definition 
1 Disposition size DSIZE: The total size of the transaction in millions of 
dollars; 
2 REIT size RSIZE: Total assets of the REITs in millions of dollars, at 
the end of the last fiscal quarter prior to the 
announcement; 
3 Natural logarithm 
of REIT size 
LNRSIZE: Natural logarithm of the total assets of the REIT in 
millions of dollars, at the end of last fiscal quarter 
prior to the announcement; 
4 Disposition size 
and REIT size 
ratio 
 SIZERAT:  Total size of transaction divided by total assets of 
the REIT, at the end of last fiscal quarter prior to 
the announcement; 
5 FFO and REIT 
size ratio 
FFO_TA:  Funds from Operations divided by total assets of 
the REIT at the end of last fiscal quarter and the 
second last fiscal quarter prior to the 
announcement; 
6 Total debt and 
REIT size ratio 
DASSETS:  Total debt divided by total assets of the selling 




cap rate and 
transaction cap 
rate 
CAP_DIF: The overall market cap rate of the same property 
type at one month prior to the announcement 
minus the transacted cap rate of each disposition in 
the sample; 
8 Difference 
between cap rate 
and dividend 
yield 
CAP_DY: Transacted cap rate of each disposition minus the 
dividend yield of the REIT upon the 
announcement; 
9 Difference 
between cap rate 
and REIT yield 
CAP_YIELDREIT Transacted cap rate of each disposition minus the 
average yield of the REIT remaining portfolio 
upon the announcement; 
10 Reduce debt      RDEBT:  Indicator variable equals to 1 if funds from sale are 
used to reduce debt; 
11 Focus     FOCUS: Indicator variable equals to 1 if sale is motivated 
by need to increase geographical focus; 
12 Reinvest       REINV: Indicator variable equals to 1 if funds from sale are 
used for new asset acquisitions; 
13 1031 Exchange        EXCH:  Indicator variable equals to 1 if 1031 tax-free 
exchange is used;  
14 Share repurchase        SREP:  Indicator variable equals to 1 if funds from sale are 
used to repurchase stocks; 
15 Office OFF: Indicator variable equals to 1 if the selling REIT is 
classified as office; 
16 Industrial INDL: Indicator variable equals to 1 if the selling REIT is 
classified as industrial; 
17 Residential           RESI:  Indicator variable equals to 1 if the selling REIT is 
classified as residential; 
18 Diversified              DF:  Indicator variable equals to 1 if the selling REIT is 
classified as diversified; 
19 Other OTHER: Indicator variable equals to 1 if the selling REIT is 
classified as other type. 
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Table 5.3 reports the summary statistics for the explanatory variables for the entire 
sample. The dispositions range from 20 million to 1,086 million with an average of 98 
million. There is a big divergence in terms of REITs size as proxied by total assets, 
ranging from 145 million to 25,719 million.  
Table 5.3 Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables for the Entire 
Sample 
    Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Continuous Variable         
DSIZE 98 124 20 1,086 
RSIZE 4,905 5,109 145 25,719 
LNRSIZE 8.08 0.93 4.98 10.15 
SIZARAT 0.04 0.06 0.001 0.61 
FFO_TA 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
DASSETS 0.55 0.12 0.01 0.90 
Indicator Variable     
RDEBT 0.35 N/A 0 1 
FOCUS 0.11 N/A 0 1 
REINV 0.34 N/A 0 1 
EXCH 0.09 N/A 0 1 
SREP 0.05 N/A 0 1 
OFF 0.26 N/A 0 1 
INDL 0.02 N/A 0 1 
RESI 0.35 N/A 0 1 
DF 0.07 N/A 0 1 
OTHER 0.10 N/A 0 1 





Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables for the Cap Rate 
Sample 
  Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
Continuous Variable      
DSIZE  97 148 20 1,086 
RSIZE  5,012 5,144 501 25,719 
LNRSIZE  8.15 0.84 6.22 10.15 
SIZARAT  0.03 0.03 0.001 0.21 
FFO_TA  0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
DASSETS  0.54 0.11 0.17 0.81 
CAP  0.070 0.018 0.029 0.120 
CAP_MKT 0.072 0.009 0.057 0.099 
CAP_DIF  0.003 0.013 -0.054 0.037 
DY  0.061 0.029 0.012 0.203 
CAP_DY  0.009 0.031 -0.129 0.085 
YIELDREIT  0.083 0.026 0.006 0.171 
CAP_YIELDREIT  -0.013 0.034 -0.103 0.077 
Indicator Variable     
RDEBT  0.36 N/A 0 1 
FOCUS  0.17 N/A 0 1 
REINV  0.30 N/A 0 1 
EXCH  0.10 N/A 0 1 
SREP  0.07 N/A 0 1 
OFF  0.29 N/A 0 1 
INDL  0.01 N/A 0 1 
RESI  0.37 N/A 0 1 
DF  0.07 N/A 0 1 
OTHER   0.05 N/A 0 1 
Source: Author, 2010 
Table 5.4 reports the summary statistics for the explanatory variables for the cap rate 
sample. The minimum REIT size increases from 145 million to 501 million, which 
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means that some smaller REITs in the entire sample do not appear in the cap rate 
sample. 
We control for the REITs size using LNRSIZE, which is the natural logarithm of the 
REITs’ total assets at the end of the last fiscal quarter prior to the disposition 
announcement.  
Since the overall abnormal return is positive, we expect that the higher the disposition 
size to the selling REIT’s size, the larger the abnormal return. Zaima and Hearth 
(1985), Klein (1986) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) find that the divesting firm 
abnormal returns increase with the relative size of the assets sold.  We capture this 
effect by the variable of SIZERAT which is the ratio of the disposition size to the 
REIT’s size.  
We control for the REITs’ financial status before the disposition using DASSETS, 
which is the REIT’s debt ratio at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the disposition 
announcement. Several studies indicate that asset dispositions are used as a way of 
generating cash when the firm is financially constrained. Ofek (1993) and Kruse 
(2002) find that firms with high leverage are more likely to sell assets. Lang, Poulsen 
and Stulz (1995) show that the wealth effects of debt repayment may be related to the 
divesting firm’s debt ratio prior to the asset dispositions. We expect the coefficient of 
this variable to be positive. 
FFO_TA captures the REIT’s operating performance prior to the disposition 
announcement. The efficiency hypothesis argues that asset dispositions are motivated 
by the correction of inefficient asset allocation. Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 
(2006) find evidence that REITs with weaker operating efficiency prior to property 
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dispositions benefit more from property dispositions, and inefficiency for better 
performing REITs is not serious. Based on the efficiency hypothesis, we expect to see 
a negative relationship between abnormal returns and FFO_TA.  
We include the indicator variables that were discussed in previous literature and most 
frequently cited in the disposition announcements. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) 
find that the stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive when the proceeds are paid 
out and market discounts proceeds retained by the firm. RDEBT and SREP indicate 
the REIT’s intention to pay out the sale proceeds to debtholders and to shareholders, 
respectively. We expect both variables to be positively related to abnormal returns.  
REINV indicates REIT’s intention to reinvest the sale proceeds. Because of agency 
issues, management may use the sale proceeds inefficiently if they are retained within 
the firm.  Bates (2005) examine the payout and retention decision in asset sales and 
find that firms retaining the sale proceeds tend to overinvest relative to the industry 
benchmark. As Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) show that the abnormal returns are 
positive when the proceeds are used to retire debt but negative when the proceeds are 
reinvested, we expect REINV to be negatively related to abnormal return.  
EXCH indicates a property disposition structured as a Section 1031 tax-deferred 
exchange.  Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code states the recognition rules for 
realized gains that arise as a result of an exchange of “like-kind” property. Under this 
rule, a firm can defer capital gain taxes from the sale of a property by purchasing 
another property of “like-kind”. The property to be exchanged must be identified 
within 45 days, and received within 180 days.
 
Holmes and Slade (2001) find that there 
is a competitive disadvantage in negotiating prices for both sellers and buyers using 
76 
 
Section 1031 tax-deferred exchange. For taxable firms, the disadvantage is overcome 
by the benefit of the tax deferral. REITs cannot utilize this benefit as they do not pay 
corporate taxes. For REITs that use the Section 1031 exchange, the obligation to pay 
out the capital gains as dividend is deferred instead of the capital gain taxes. 
Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) find that in asset sales, due to the agency cost of 
managerial discretion, stock returns are higher when sale proceeds are paid out to 
shareholders than when proceeds are retained by the selling firms.  McIntosh, Ott and 
Liang (1995) find that share holder returns are higher if REITs increase dividends 
with property dispositions. Hence, we expect that the elimination of dividend 
associated with a Section 1031 exchange decrease returns. EXCH is expected to be 
negatively related to abnormal return.  
FOCUS characterizes a property disposition in which the selling REIT emphasis the 
purpose of sale is to increase the portfolio’s geographical focus. Dittmar and 
Shivdasani (2003) investigate the investment efficiency of divesting firms and find 
that segment sales are associated with a reduction of diversification discount.  Morden 
REITs are quite focus with respect to property type. As for geography, the degree of 
focus is not that high. As shown by Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), 
acquisition associated with geographical diversification reduce value. We include 
geographical FOCUS as an indicator variable and expect that it is positively related to 
abnormal returns.  
After running the first regression, we add the three cap rate difference variables and 
run another three regressions. If the cap rate conveys information and the market 
favors a higher difference between the overall market cap rate and the transacted cap 
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rate as postulated in Hypothesis 1, the abnormal return would be positively related 
with this difference variable. If the market favors a lower cap rate and dividend yield 
difference as postulated in Hypothesis 2, the abnormal return would be negatively 
related with the second difference variable. If the market dislikes the yield dilutive 
dispositions as postulated in Hypothesis 3(a), the abnormal returns would be 
negatively related with the third difference variable. In contrast, if the market favors 
the yield dilutive dispositions since they lower the portfolio risk as postulated in 
Hypothesis 3(b), the abnormal returns would be positively related with the third 
difference variable.   In all these four regressions, we add indicator variables of 
property type. The omitted variable is the indicator variable for those cases in which 
the divested property is retail. We also control for year effects. 
Table 5.5 summaries the expected effects of the explanatory variables on abnormal 
returns.  
Table 5.5 Expected Effects for the Four Regressions 




FFO and REIT size ratio FFO_TA - Efficiency Hypothesis 
Total debt and REIT size ratio DASSETS + Financing Hypothesis 
Reduce debt RDEBT + Financing Hypothesis 
Reinvest REINV - Financing Hypothesis 
Focus FOCUS + Focus Hypothesis 
Difference between market cap 
rate and transaction cap rate 
CAP_DIF + Hypothesis 1 
Difference between cap rate 
and dividend yield 
CAP_DY - Hypothesis 2 
Difference between property 
yield and REIT portfolio yield 
CAP_YIELDREIT - Hypothesis 3(a) 
Difference between property 
yield and REIT portfolio yield 
CAP_YIELDREIT + Hypothesis 3(b) 
Source: Author, 2010 
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Table 5.6 displays the results of the four regression analyses, which involve the 
individual 3-day CAR (-1, +1) against a set of explanatory variables. 
 
Table 5.6 Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Returns 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
LNSIZE 0.06  0.21  0.22  0.12 
 (0.27)  (0.83)  (0.91)  (0.47) 
SIZARAT 22.37  2.60  2.98  7.98 
 (2.09)**  (0.39)  (0.45)  (1.09) 
FFO_TA 48.71  63.23  59.18  84.05 
 (1.73)*  (2.04)**  (1.68)*  (2.88)*** 
DASSETS 3.88  4.40  4.88  5.97 
 (1.95)*  (2.21)**  (2.31)**  (3.02)*** 
CAP_DIF   31.91  39.19  57.12 
   (2.37)**  (2.19)**  (3.14)*** 
CAP_DY     8.97   
     (0.58)   
CAP_YIELDREIT      21.15 
       (1.99)** 
RDEBT 0.85  1.21  1.23  1.25 
 (2.04)**  (2.23)**  (2.25)**  (2.34)** 
FOCUS 0.46  -0.17  -0.17  -0.18 
 (0.72)  (-0.24)  (-0.24)  (-0.26) 
REINV -0.56  -0.15  -0.20  -0.29 
 (-1.46)  (-0.30)  (-0.39)  (-0.56) 
EXCH -0.72  -1.51  -1.52  -1.59 
 (-1.52)  (-2.00)**  (-1.99)**  (2.06)** 
SREP -0.70  -0.05  0.08  0.08 
 (-0.71)  (-0.05)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
CONST -2.51  -2.48  -3.07  -3.07 
  (-0.97)   (-0.94)   (-1.13)   (-1.13) 
Observations 288  113  113  113 
R-squared 0.26   0.39   0.40   0.42 
Robust t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: Author, 2010 
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In Model 1 for the entire sample, SIZERAT is significantly positive related to 
abnormal returns as excepted. It is significant at 5% level.  This result is consistent 
with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006). It also confirms earlier findings by 
Zaima and Hearth (1985), who state that the size of the divesture matters, with larger 
deals exhibiting larger excess returns. Such transactions will increase the eventual 
capital income available for distribution, which is preferred by the market. However, 
in Model 2 Model 3 and Model 4 for the cap rate sample, this variable is positive but 
insignificant. This may be due to the divergence in REITs size of the cap rate sample 
is narrower than that of the entire sample.  
The coefficients on FFO_TA are significantly positive in all the four regressions. This 
result contradicts with that of Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006), who find FFO 
to total asset, a measurement of the REITs operating performance before property 
disposition, is significantly negative related to shareholder returns. They explain this 
result as consistent with efficient deployment hypothesis. However, this hypothesis is 
not supported in this study. The contradicting results on this variable with Campbell, 
Petrova and Sirmans may be explained by the divergence in the variable values of the 
two samples.  The average value of FFO_TA in our entire sample is 0.01, ranging 
from -0.04 to 0.03, while in Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans sample the value of this 
variable ranges from -0.07 to 0.07. In our sample, there is not much difference among 
the REITs with respect to their operating performance before divesting properties, 
thus the subsequent efficiency gains on property dispositions are not significant for 
relatively poor performing REITs.   
DASSETS is found to be significantly and positively related to abnormal returns. This 
result is consistent across all the four regressions. Thus we find evidence that the 
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REITs with higher debt ratio prior to the property dispositions benefit more from 
divesting. This result provides further evidence to the relevant asset divestiture works 
(Ofek, 1993; Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, 1995; Kruse, 2002), and supports the financing 
hypothesis.  
Another piece of evidence that supports the financing hypothesis is that divesting 
REITs’ decision to reduce debt increase shareholder returns. It is indicated by the 
positive sign on the variable RDEBT, which is significantly positive at 5% level 
across all the four regressions. 
EXCH is significantly and negative related to abnormal returns in Model 2, Model 3 
and Model 4. It’s negative but insignificant for the entire sample, with a t value of -
1.53. Thus, for our subsamples, the result is consistent with Campbell, Petrova and 
Sirmans (2006), who find a significantly negative association between shareholder 
returns and the 1031 tax-free exchange. 
Even REINV is found to exhibit a negative relationship with abnormal returns in all 
the four regressions, none of the four coefficients are significant. Thus we cannot 
conclude that REITs using sale proceeds to make further acquisitions reduce 
shareholder values. 
FOCUS does not exhibit a significant relationship with abnormal returns. In addition, 
the coefficients on this variable are not consistent across three models. Thus the focus 
hypothesis is not supported in this study. This may be due to that geographical 
diversification does not reduce shareholder value as business type diversification 
does. Studies of conventional firm asset dispositions with respect to focus mainly 
discuss business type focus.  
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The evidence on SREP is not significantly positive related to abnormal returns. 
Though buying back shares is a way of paying back to shareholders, its effect is not as 
obvious as the positive effect of paying back debt. The difference is retiring debt can 
improve the REIT’s leverage hence financial status.    
Since cap rate is not disclosed for every disposition, the number of observations of the 
second, the third and the fourth regression reduces from 288 to 113. Our first key 
variable which is the difference between the overall market cap rate and the transacted 
cap rate is positively related to abnormal returns. This means that the larger the 
difference in cap rates, the higher the abnormal return would be. Thus our first 
hypothesis is supported. We can now conclude that the difference between the overall 
market cap rate and the transaction cap rate do carry out important information in 
evaluating shareholder returns around disposition announcements. After controlling 
for other possible contributions to abnormal returns, the relative deal conditions do 
significantly affect shareholder values.  
The sign on the second key variable CAP_DY is contrary to our expectation, though 
insignificant. The difference between the cap rate in direct real estate market and the 
capitalization rate in the secured real estate market is not significantly relevant to 
shareholder values. Thereby our second hypothesis is not supported.  
There is a significantly positive relationship between the third key variable 
CAP_YIELDREIT and abnormal returns. This evidence is contrary to Hypothesis 3(a) but 
consistent with Hypothesis 3(b). If the cap rate or yield of a disposed property is 
larger than the average yield of the REIT portfolio, the average yield of the remaining 
portfolio will decrease after the property disposition. We expect that such yield 
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dilutive dispositions reduce shareholder values. However, as we point out in 
Hypothesis 3(b), this yield story of property transactions affects the risk factors 
underlying the properties. A property disposition may lower the yield of a property 
portfolio and lower the incomes and dividend payout to shareholders. Meanwhile, it 
also lowers the risk of the portfolio and benefit shareholders. If this is the case, the 
yield dilutive dispositions will increase shareholder returns. The result in this study 
shows that divesting REIT’s shareholders benefit from the yield dilutive dispositions 
as the dispositions lower the investing risk exposing to them hence compensate the 
yield dilutions. Table 5.7 summaries the results of the hypotheses test. We will further 
analyze this variable in detail in the following part. 
Table 5.7 Hypotheses Tested in the Cross-sectional Regressions 
Relationship with the 
Explanatory variable 
Tested Hypothesis Status Model 
Significantly positively related 
to FFO_TA 
Efficiency Hypothesis Not Supported 1,2,3,4 
Significantly positively related 
to DASSETS 
Financing Hypothesis Supported 1,2,3,4 
Significantly positively related 
to RDEBT 
Financing Hypothesis Supported 1,2,3,4 
Insignificantly related to 
FOCUS 
Focus Hypothesis Not Supported 1,2,3,4 
Significantly positively related 
to CAP_DIF 
Hypothesis 1 Supported 2,3,4 
Insignificantly negatively 
related to CAP_DY 
Hypothesis 2 Not Supported 3 
Significantly positively related 
to CAP_YIELDREIT 
Hypothesis 3(a) Not Supported 4 
Significantly positively related 
to CAP_YIELDREIT 
Hypothesis 3(b) Supported 4 
Source: Author, 2010 
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5.2.2 The Difference between Cap Rate and Dividend Yield 
We further analyze the second cap rate difference variable. We conduct two cross 
sectional regressions. In Model 5, we exclude CAP_DIF and only include CAP_DY. 
In Model 6, we decompose CAP_DY into two groups based on the sign of the variable 
values.  
Table 5.8 Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Returns (2) 
Explanatory Variables Model 5   Model 6 
LNSIZE 0.24  0.26 
 (0.92)  (0.97) 
SIZARAT 3.86  4.30 
 (0.58)  (0.65) 
FFO_TA 65.16  62.36 
 (1.95)*  (1.91)* 
DASSETS 4.77  4.88 
 (2.13)**  (2.20)** 
CAP_DY 0.21   
 (0.02)   
CAP_DY +   8.54 
   (0.55) 
CAP_DY -   -5.08 
   (-0.30) 
RDEBT 0.89  0.91 
 (1.65)  (1.68)* 
FOCUS -0.39  -0.39 
 (-0.52)  (-0.53) 
REINV -0.21  -0.22 
 (-0.41)  (-0.43) 
EXCH -1.14  -1.12 
 (-1.49)  (-1.47) 
SREP 0.22  0.15 
 (0.22)  (0.14) 
CONST -3.08  -3.54 
 (-1.1)   (-1.23) 
Observations 113  113 
R-squared 0.36   0.37 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
    Source: Author, 2010 
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In Model 5, the coefficient of CAP_DY is positive and contradicts with the second 
hypothesis, but still not significant.  We are interested in investigating whether the 
positive values or the negative values of this variable dominate in measuring its 
relationship with abnormal returns.  So we carry out another regression as discussed 
above. From Model 6 we see that the coefficients on positive CAP_DY and negative 
CAP_DY are positive and negative respectively, but neither is significant. Neither the 
positive nor the negative part of CAP_DY can dominate the other to show a strong 
relationship with abnormal returns.   
The values of CAP_DY in our sample range from -0.13 to 0.09, with a mean of 0.01. 
It is worth mentioning that CAP_DY does not exhibit balance between positive and 
negative values across the 113 observations in the cap rate sample, with 82 
observations of positive value, and 31 negative values.  Thus, the inconclusive results 
on CAP_DY may result from the limited numbers of observations of negative values. 
We expect that the more negative this value is, the higher the abnormal return. 
We expect that the lower the cap rate compared to dividend yield, the higher the 
abnormal returns. However, in the period 2001-2009, the overall market trend is that 
cap rate is dominantly higher than dividend yield (as described in Section 4.3). In the 
sample period, the observations of the adverse relationship are limited. This may be 
the main reason that results in the insignificant relationship between CAP_DY and 
shareholder returns.  
Another potential reason is that the disposition values are relatively small to the 
REITs size as measured by total assets. The average ratio of disposition size to the 
REIT size is 0.03. The minimum value is only 0.001, being too small to affect the 
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whole REIT in large.  Thus, the effect that the property is divested at a higher cap rate 
than the REIT dividend yield may be too trivial to make investors react unfavorably. 
Table 5.9 Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Returns, 2001-2007 
Explanatory Variables Model 5   Model 6 
LNSIZE 0.33  0.24 
 (1.17)  (0.84) 
SIZARAT 5.58  5.72 
 (0.72)  (0.74) 
FFO_TA 43.49  42.39 
 (0.75)  (0.72) 
DASSETS 5.49  5.28 
 (2.25)**  (2.19)** 
CAP_DY 8.14   
 (0.62)   
CAP_DY +   -3.79 
   (-0.22) 
CAP_DY -   46.36 
   (1.31) 
RDEBT 0.71  0.66 
 (1.11)  (1.01) 
FOCUS -0.12  -0.03 
 (-0.17)  (-0.04) 
REINV -0.43  -0.45 
 (-0.78)  (-0.81) 
EXCH -0.84  -0.85 
 (-1.15)  (-1.15) 
SREP 0.74  1.21 
 (0.68)  (0.95) 
CONST -4.12  -2.94 
 (-1.14)   (-0.79) 
Observations 93  93 
R-squared 0.29   0.30 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      Source: Author, 2010 
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Since cap rate is systematically higher than dividend yield from 2001 to 2007 and 
lower than dividend yield in 2008 and 2009, we replicate Model 5 and Model 6 for 
the sub period of 2001 to 2007 as a robustness test. Table 5.9 reports the results. 
The number of dispositions reduces from 113 to 93 after we exclude dispositions in 
2008 and 2009. The result on the variable Cap-DY for the sub period of 2001-2007 is 
the same with that of the whole period of 2001-2009. It is positive but insignificantly 
related to abnormal returns. There are 74 positive and 19 negative values of this 
variable. Neither the positive nor the negative value of this variable has a significant 
impact on abnormal returns. 
 
In conclusion, our empirical results show that property dispositions do generate 
positive wealth effects for selling REITs’ shareholders. The value gains come from 
several sources. The cross-sectional regressions show that abnormal returns are 
positively related to the selling REITs debt ratio prior to disposition announcements, 
the decision to retire debt with sale proceeds, the difference between the market cap 
rate and the transaction cap rate and the difference between the property and REIT 
portfolio yield. In contrast, the disposition that is structured as a part of Section 1031 
tax-free exchange is found to reduce shareholder values. The effect of the difference 
between transaction cap rate and divesting REITs’ dividend yield is not significant, 
mainly due to the overall market trend in cap rate and dividend yield in the study 
period of 2001-2009. Some small values of disposition size divided by REITs size 
may also lead to the consequence that the contribution of this difference is not 
obvious as expected. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 Contributions of the Study 
Through examining the wealth effects of REITs property dispositions, we focus on 
analyzing the sources of gain in property dispositions. We identify cap rate as an 
important factor in influencing the shareholder values. This study makes two 
contributions to the research on property transactions. First, it provides a way of 
linking information on a single property transaction with the overall market condition. 
This linkage is premised on the comparison of transaction cap rate with the overall 
market cap rate. We find evidence that abnormal returns around property disposition 
announcements are positively related to the difference between overall market cap 
rate and the transaction cap rate. This means that the larger the difference, the higher 
the shareholder value.   
Second, this study also provides a way of linking information from the direct property 
market and the capital market. The point of departure with previous works on the 
integration of direct real estate market and capital market is that the linkage of the two 
markets built in this study is at micro (firm) level. 
6.2 Major Findings 
This study begins with an investigation into the wealth effects of REITs property 
dispositions. We use event parameter model to examine the abnormal returns of 
individual REIT using the REIT’s stock returns and a market index around the 
property disposition announcement. After the event study, we perform a cross-
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sectional regression to evaluate the possible causes of the abnormal returns resulting 
from property disposition. 
The property disposition sample used in this study is obtained from the combination 
of RCA and SNL Financial database. The sample covers 288 dispositions from 78 
public-listed U.S. equity REITs from January 2001 to December 2009. 
This thesis moves beyond the previous literature on asset dispositions by utilizing the 
information of cap rate that is disclosed with the disposition. We test three hypotheses 
in the empirical analysis.  
The various proposed examinations yielded the following findings:  
1. Property dispositions by REITs are found to lead to positive significant abnormal 
shareholder returns around the disposition announcement date. The average abnormal 
returns on the event day (D0) and the day before the disposition announcement (D-1) 
are 0.18% and 0.14% respectively. The three-day average abnormal returns (CAR-1, 
+1) is found to be 0.26% and statistically significant. These results are consistent with 
previous studies by Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1991) on conventional firms 
that divest real estate assets, and Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) on REITs 
property sell-offs.  
2. The disposition with a larger difference between the overall market cap rate and a 
transaction cap rate generates higher abnormal returns. This result confirms the 
relevance of cap rate in evaluating value gains in property dispositions.  
3. Yield dilutive dispositions result in higher abnormal returns. This is because that 
the dispositions lower the risk exposing to the divesting REIT’s shareholders.  
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4. The abnormal returns are positively related to the REITs debt ratio prior to the 
property dispositions, and the decision to use the proceeds to pay back existing debt, 
lending support to the financing hypothesis of asset dispositions. 
5. The disposition that is structured as a part of the Section 1031 tax-free exchange is 
found to be negatively related to abnormal returns, thus reduce shareholder value. 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations in this study. The sampling does account for selection bias 
by including property dispositions by delisted REITs. But compared to current listed 
REITs, the number is smaller. This is due to the property transaction data on delisted 
REITs is limited.  
We utilize the information content of cap rate to carry out a comparison between the 
overall market cap rate and the transacted cap rate and do see in some transactions 
differences exist and contribute to shareholder values. However, we do not uncover 
the sources of this difference. It may result from difference in risk factors associated 
with diverse locations. Or there is possibility that some properties disposed of at a 
lower price are distressed sales.  
This study tries to analyze how the differences in transaction cap rate and dividend 
yield affect shareholder values. However, in the study period of 2001 to 2009, the 
overall market trend is that cap rate is larger than dividend yield. This market fact 
may render the analysis inconclusive, as we see much less negative values of the 




6.4 Recommendations for Future Studies 
The observations of this paper signify opportunities to further examine issues relating 
to REITs property transactions. Some suggestions are as follows: 
1. The RCA and SNL Financial database have an extensive coverage of real estate 
transaction data. Hence, a similar study can be carried out to analyze property 
acquisitions by REITs with emphasis on analyzing the information content of cap rate 
to give a full picture of property transactions. 
2. It would be enlightening to investigate the interaction of REITs capital structure 
decisions with property transactions. For instance, the enquiries on how REITs with 
different leverage levels choose to divest and acquire properties and how they adjust 
capital structure following property acquisitions and dispositions would yield 
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